Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information - The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding by Wistrich, Andrew J. et al.
 
 
(1251) 
 
CAN JUDGES IGNORE INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION?  THE 
DIFFICULTY OF DELIBERATELY DISREGARDING 
ANDREW J. WISTRICH,† CHRIS GUTHRIE†† & JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI††† 
Due process requires courts to make decisions based on the evidence before 
them without regard to information outside of the record.  Skepticism about the 
ability of jurors to ignore inadmissible information is widespread.  Empirical 
research confirms that this skepticism is well-founded.  Many courts and com-
mentators, however, assume that judges can accomplish what jurors cannot.  
This Article reports the results of experiments we have conducted to determine 
whether judges can ignore inadmissible information.  We found that the judges 
who participated in our experiments struggled to perform this challenging men-
tal task.  The judges had difficulty disregarding demands disclosed during a 
settlement conference, conversation protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
prior sexual history of an alleged rape victim, prior criminal convictions of a 
plaintiff, and information the government had promised not to rely upon at 
sentencing.  This information influenced judges’ decisions even when they were 
reminded, or themselves had ruled, that the information was inadmissible.  In 
contrast, the judges were able to ignore inadmissible information obtained in 
violation of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel and the outcome of a search 
when determining whether probable cause existed.  We conclude that judges are 
generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but inadmissible infor-
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mation of which they are aware.  Nevertheless, judges displayed a surprising 
ability to do so in some situations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trials search for truth by excluding certain truths.1 
An entire field of law—the law of evidence—is devoted to deter-
mining what information is admissible, what information is inadmissi-
ble, and what information may be admitted for limited purposes only.2  
Decisions based on inadmissible evidence, or on admissible evidence 
used for an improper purpose, are illegitimate3 and violate principles 
of due process.4  Unless any resulting error is “harmless,” such deci-
sions are subject to reversal.5 
Evidence rules excluding relevant information fall into two catego-
ries.6  First, “intrinsic exclusionary rules” exclude relevant information 
on the ground that its omission will promote accurate fact finding.7  
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which excludes relevant in-
formation where its probative value is outweighed by the risk that it 
will confuse or mislead the fact finder, is an example.8  Second, “ex-
 
1 See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 149 (1997) (noting the 
“striking emphasis on the screening of information to be submitted to triers of fact”). 
2 See Orie L. Phillips, A Symposium On Evidence:  Foreword, 5 VAND. L. REV. 275, 275 
(1952) (“‘Evidence’ imports the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of 
which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved.  It embraces the rules 
of law governing the admissibility or rejection of proffered proof and the weight to be 
given to proof that is admitted.” (footnote omitted)). 
3 See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 51, at 109 n.1 (Edward 
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK] (“The fact issues 
at the trial should be decided upon the facts ‘in the record,’ i. e. [sic], facts officially 
introduced in accordance with the rules of practice, and facts which the court may ju-
dicially notice.”). 
4 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“[T]he decisionmaker’s conclu-
sion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing.”). 
5 Trial verdicts, however, are seldom reversed due to evidentiary error.  See Marga-
ret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 893, 894-96 (1992) (finding that in 1990—a time when the federal district 
courts conducted about 20,000 criminal and civil bench and jury trials a year—only 
thirty trial verdicts were reversed for evidentiary error:  sixteen for erroneous admis-
sion and fourteen for erroneous exclusion). 
6 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence).  Evidence rules also ex-
clude irrelevant information.  Id. 402. 
7 DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 14. 
8 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, con-
fusion, or waste of time). 
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trinsic exclusionary rules” exclude relevant evidence to promote a pol-
icy interest, regardless of its impact on the accuracy of fact finding.9  
Examples include rules excluding evidence of pretrial settlement pro-
posals10 as well as various privileges, such as the attorney-client privi-
lege.11 
The best way to prevent inadmissible information from influenc-
ing jurors is to shield them from it altogether.  Despite the best efforts 
of courts, however, jurors are sometimes exposed to inadmissible in-
formation through media accounts of the case or impermissible com-
ments by lawyers or witnesses during trial.  When such exposure oc-
curs, judges attempt to undermine its influence by instructing jurors 
to limit their use of the information or to disregard it entirely.12  Judi-
cial opinions on the issue tend to embrace a “strong presumption that 
proper limiting instructions will reduce the possibility of prejudice to 
an acceptable level.”13 
Nonetheless, courts and commentators have long worried that ju-
rors cannot “unbit[e] the apple of knowledge.”14  For example, Justice 
Robert Jackson once argued that “[t]he naive assumption that preju-
 
9 DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 12. 
10 FED. R. EVID. 408; see also id. 410 (excluding guilty pleas).  Rule 408 actually is a 
hybrid.  Evidence of settlement offers is excludable for two reasons:  “(1) The evidence 
is irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from 
any concession of weakness of position,” and “(2) . . . promotion of the public policy 
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”  FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory 
committee’s note.  Because the latter is described as “a more consistently impressive 
ground,” id., Rule 408 is best placed in the extrinsic category. 
11 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that the attorney-
client privilege “has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-
finder”). 
12 See J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. 
REV. 71, 76-78 (1990) (distinguishing between “admonitions” to disregard evidence 
and “limiting instructions” to confine evidence to its proper scope). 
13 United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435, 447 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301, 303 (1981) (claiming that an instruction to disregard in-
admissible testimony is a “powerful tool” that can be used “to remove from the jury’s 
deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 858 (1st Cir. 1990) (“There is 
ordinarily a presumption that a jury will follow such curative instructions.  This pre-
sumption will be defeated only if there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will 
. . . be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect 
would be devastating to the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission 
in original)); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he subse-
quent striking of erroneously admitted evidence accompanied by a clear and positive 
instruction to the jury to disregard cures the error.”). 
14 DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 50. 
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dicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all prac-
ticing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”15  Judge Learned Hand 
agreed with this skeptical assessment.  He said that when judges at-
tempt to “unring the bell”16 by telling jurors to limit their use of evi-
dence or to ignore it entirely, they are recommending a “mental gym-
nastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody[] 
else[’s].”17  Legal scholars concur that some prohibitory and limiting 
instructions do not work,18 and may even be counterproductive.19  
 
15 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
16 Leighton Bledsoe, Jury or Nonjury Trial—A Defense Viewpoint, 5 AM. JUR. Trials § 
12, at 123, 137 (1966). 
17 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).  Damaška elaborates 
on this as follows: 
Consider the cognitive premises of limited admissibility rules, for example.  
When jurors are told to use a piece of evidence for a narrow inferential pur-
pose, the successful completion of this task often calls for sophisticated mental 
operations.  Preventing one’s inference from overflowing into legally forbid-
den territory can even be a real psychological feat—if it is psychologically pos-
sible at all.  One of the most obvious examples is the demand that a defen-
dant’s criminal record be used only as it affects the credibility of his in-court 
testimony.  To prevent the ripple effects of this information from producing a 
broader probative impact on belief formation presupposes remarkable self-
control and intellectual delicacy.  Not much less sophistication is needed to 
consider an item of information only for the purpose of determining whether 
it was made (rather than also for its truth) or to employ a piece of information 
only with regard to one of several joint charges arising from a single event. 
DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 33. 
18 See, e.g., Paul Bergman, Admonishing Jurors to Disregard What They Haven’t Heard, 
25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 689, 691 (1992) (“The effectiveness of admonitions to control ju-
ror behavior is open to question.”); Tanford, supra note 12, at 86 (“Admonitions . . . 
are difficult for jurors to understand . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 4.18, at 204 (2d ed. 
1973) (explaining that the serious disadvantage of requesting an instruction telling the 
jury to disregard evidence in considering a particular issue is that “it calls to the jury’s 
attention your recognition of the relevance of the evidence to the very issue on which 
you are seeking to avoid their considering it”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 41, at 224 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that requiring 
the party seeking to limit the use of evidence to request a limiting instruction “appropri-
ately leaves to the opposing trial counsel the option of concluding that . . . he is better off 
without an instruction . . . [as it] would serve only to remind the jury of what it has 
heard . . . and . . . to suggest . . . a use for the evidence which is best left unmentioned”); 
Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer 
Payne, Jury Decision Making:  45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) (“In general, limiting instructions have 
proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase in 
the targeted behavior.”); Tanford, supra note 12, at 86 (“Admonishing jurors often 
provokes the opposite of the intended effect.”). 
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Most observers agree that it is not easy for jurors to deliberately disre-
gard what they know.20 
Assessments of judges’ capabilities tend to be more generous.  
Some courts21 and commentators22 have argued that judges are much 
 
20 See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (commenting 
that it might be “extreme” to say that nobody can control his reasoning and avoid con-
sidering relevant evidence he is told to disregard, but observing that “relatively few per-
sons” can do so because “it does a violence to all our habitual ways of thinking,” and 
commenting that limiting instructions are a “placebo” in the context of coconspirator 
hearsay admitted against the speaker and that such instructions should not be “the fi-
nal measure of protection” for defendants), aff’d, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled in part 
by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (concluding that such limiting instruc-
tions are inadequate protection for defendants); see also JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES:  
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 47 (1983) (arguing that “it is inherently 
impossible to will an empty mind”). 
21 See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting in part) (“[T]rial judges often have access to inadmissible and highly prejudi-
cial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard it.”); Harris v. 
Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (per curiam) (“In bench trials, judges routinely hear 
inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore . . . . It is equally routine for 
them to instruct juries that no adverse inference may be drawn from a defendant’s 
failure to testify . . . presum[ably] they follow their own instructions when they are act-
ing as factfinders.”); State v. Garcia, 397 P.2d 214, 216 (Ariz. 1964) (holding that in 
criminal cases, as in civil cases, the court will not consider improper admission of evi-
dence as error on appeal from a bench trial “because of the presumption that the trial 
judge disregarded all inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision”); Peterson v. 
State, 61 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Neb. 1953) (“The rule which this court applies in reviewing 
a finding of a trial court, in either a civil or a criminal case, . . . is that it is presumed 
that improper evidence taken under objection was given no weight in reaching the fi-
nal conclusion unless the contrary appears.” (quoting Birmingham v. State, 279 N.W. 
15, 17 (Wis. 1938)); Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 n.6 (Pa. 1980) (“A 
judge, as factfinder, is presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence and consider only 
competent evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Glover, 405 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979) (per curiam) (concluding that a judge “must be presumed to be able to disre-
gard inflammatory evidence”).  The assumption that judges can ignore inadmissible 
information indirectly colors our expectations of lawyers, in addition to judges.  See 
State v. Moreland, No. 83977, 2004 WL 2829015, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2004) 
(holding that failure to object to evidence during a bench trial in a criminal case was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel because “defense counsel could reasonably assume 
that the judge would be unaffected by any inflammatory evidence and would disregard 
any irrelevant evidence”). 
22 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.431, 
at 64 (2004) (arguing that judges are good at ignoring inadmissible materials because 
they are “accustomed to reviewing matters that may not be admissible”); MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 3, at 10 (“[I]t is realistic to suppose that judges can do 
better than juries in relying on what is admissible and ignoring what is not.”); A. Leo 
Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. 
REV. 905, 916 (1971) (dismissing the idea “that the rule of admissibility in the nonjury 
case should be precisely identical” to the rule of admissibility in the case tried to a jury, 
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better able than jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence.  Judges them-
selves often apply evidentiary rules more loosely in bench trials than in 
jury trials23 on the theory that “the judge, a professional experienced 
in evaluating evidence, may more readily be relied upon to sift and to 
weigh critically evidence which we fear to entrust to a jury.”24  This 
makes some sense.  Experience might enable judges to ignore preju-
dicial aspects of evidence more readily than jurors, thereby justifying a 
looser interpretation of the intrinsic exclusionary rules.  Judges also 
likely understand and respect the purposes behind the extrinsic exclu-
sionary rules more so than jurors, thereby providing judges with 
greater motivation to ignore the evidence that these rules proscribe.  
Indeed, some commentators have even suggested that legal systems 
should have separate rules of evidence for jury trials and bench trials 
because of assumed differences in the motivation and capabilities of 
jurors and judges.25 
 
since “[f]eats of discrimination are expected of the jurors and it is not unreasonable to 
allow an added measure of tolerance where it is the judge who will be weighing the 
evidence”). 
23 Based upon the assumption that the greater training and experience of trial 
judges immunize them against mistakes to which jurors may be susceptible, some 
courts have stated that the rules of evidence apply less strictly in bench trials than in 
jury trials.  See, e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 206 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he argu-
ment was to a three-judge panel, so any inflammatory effect was de minimis . . . .”); 
Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
for certain types of evidence, courts apply a more “liberal admissibility rule” in bench 
trials than in jury trials, and adding that “the distinction between a bench and a jury 
trial may affect” the analysis of whether relevant information should be excluded un-
der Rule 403); see also MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 60, at 137 (“It might 
have been more expedient if these rules [of evidence] had been, at least in the main, 
discarded in trials before judges.  Their professional experience in valuing evidence 
greatly lessens the need for exclusionary rules.” (footnote omitted)); MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 3, at 9-10 (explaining that, although “[t]he Federal Rules 
of Evidence apply alike in cases tried to courts and cases tried to juries,” judges in 
bench-tried cases “usually apply the Rules with less rigor and let in more evidence”); 
Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 905 (“It should occasion no surprise that the vast wel-
ter of doctrine which has become our law of evidence is not applied with equal rigor 
when a judge rather than a jury sits as trier of the fact.”); John MacArthur Maguire & 
Charles S.S. Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 
YALE L.J. 1101, 1116-17 (1927) (observing that the willingness of some courts to in-
dulge the presumption that judges always weigh evidence in accordance with the law 
has meant that the trial judge is bound “somewhat less finically” by the evidence rules). 
24 Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 906. 
25 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 
A.B.A. J. 723, 725 (1964) (proposing that the evidence rules designed to guide juries 
should give way to enlarged discretion and broad standards for bench trials); Kenneth 
Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363 (1970) (arguing that 
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Other courts26 and commentators27 are skeptical that judges are 
any better than jurors at disregarding inadmissible evidence.  In Sum-
merlin v. Stewart,28 for example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona,29 which prohibits judges 
from conducting fact finding in capital sentencing, applied retroac-
tively.  The court based its decision in part on its concern that judges 
 
judges should be allowed to admit hearsay in nonjury cases without ruling on its admis-
sibility and, in some cases, base findings on such evidence); G.D. Nokes, The English 
Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 171 (1956) (supporting legislation in 
England that distinguishes between bench and jury trials in determining the admissi-
bility of hearsay, and urging abolition of the rule against hearsay in civil bench trials).  
See generally F.R. Lacy, “Civilizing” Nonjury Trials, 19 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1965) (contend-
ing that it would be feasible to establish separate procedural rules for bench and jury 
trials). 
26 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Pa. 
1967) (stating that it is “impossible” for a judge to “objectively and reliably determine 
that the [defendant’s allegedly involuntary] confession was voluntary after considering 
his guilt”), aff’d, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); id. at 695 (“[The task of 
deliberately disregarding] “becomes too great when we require a judge who has heard 
evidence of guilt, to objectively and coldly assess a distinct issue as to the voluntariness 
of the confession.  Objectivity cannot be guaranteed, and reliability must be ques-
tioned.”); United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1966) 
(questioning, in a case where an allegedly involuntary confession was admitted into 
evidence, “whether a judge sitting as fact-finder would be able to pass on guilt or inno-
cence without being influenced by evidence relating to the voluntariness issue”, cited in 
Rundle, 268 F. Supp. at 695-96; State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970) (ac-
knowledging that “judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and 
human frailties as affect other members of the specie [sic],” but going on to state that a 
judge, due to “his legal training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state 
of the art of his profession,” and his ability “to perceive, distinguish and interpret the 
nuances of the law,” is nevertheless fortified against those frailties). 
27 See, e.g., DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 50 (“[T]he juryless court is a unitary tribunal:  
the admissibility of evidence is decided here by the ultimate fact finder, who inevitably 
comes into contact with tainted information.  And when this information is persuasive, 
the professional judge has as much trouble ignoring the acquired knowledge as do 
amateur adjudicators.”); Bledsoe, supra note 16, § 12, at 137 (questioning “whether 
anyone can ‘unring the bell’ once it is heard,” that is, whether a judge can “persuade 
himself not to be influenced by facts which the law in its wisdom, gained from long ex-
perience over the centuries, has decreed should not be heard by the trier of facts,” and 
opining that “unfavorable evidence thus received probably does exert an undesirable 
influence on the court as trier of the facts”); Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 910 
(recognizing that “it would be wrong to assume a priori that a judge would be immune 
from prejudice” from inadmissible information); Maguire & Epstein, supra note 23, at 
1115 (explaining that some incompetent evidence may affect judges because “[n]ature 
does not furnish a jurist’s brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the conven-
ience of legal theory, and convincing evidence once heard does leave its mark”). 
28 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schriro v. Summer-
lin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004). 
29 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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are likely to be inappropriately influenced by inadmissible informa-
tion they may encounter during sentencing.  As the court noted, 
the judge is exposed to prejudicial information which the law, in its re-
gard for the right of the defendant, aims to screen out of the evaluation 
of his guilt or innocence.  The law’s ideal in this situation may be some-
thing of a libertarian luxury.  Our only point is that the law cannot easily 
achieve it without a jury.
30
 
Still others assert that judges can disregard inadmissible informa-
tion in some circumstances, but not in others.  For example, in a suit 
brought by the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch against Vice President 
Cheney,31 Justice Scalia implied that judges possess a limited ability to 
compartmentalize their knowledge.  Prior to the Supreme Court hear-
ing in the case, the Vice President and Justice Scalia had gone duck 
hunting together.32  Defending his refusal to recuse himself, Justice 
Scalia noted that social contacts between high-level officials and Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court have “never been thought improper” in 
cases involving actions the official took in an “official capacity” rather 
than a “personal capacity.”33  These assertions imply that if the Vice 
President were sued in an unofficial capacity, Justice Scalia’s personal 
knowledge of the Vice President’s character would impinge on his 
ability to decide the case fairly.  But because the suit involved only the 
official aspects of the Vice President’s life, Justice Scalia argued that he 
could set aside his personal knowledge about the Vice President.  Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, judges can disregard information outside the 
record, but this ability has its limits. 
This Article reports the results of experiments designed to test the 
ability of trial court judges to disregard inadmissible information.  
 
30 341 F.3d at 1113 (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN 
JURY 127 (1966)).  The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit decision arose, 
in part, from the conclusion that judicial fact finding does not “seriously diminish[]” 
the accuracy of the sentencing process.  124 S. Ct. at 2525 (emphasis omitted).  The 
majority did not directly address the issue of whether judges can ignore inadmissible 
information, instead relying on the casual observation that “for every argument why 
juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate.”  Id.  
For the majority, the most notable argument for the superiority of judges is judges’ ex-
perience and understanding of the law.  Id. 
31 In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated by Cheney v. United States 
Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). 
32 See David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2004, at A1 (noting that the “longtime friends” spent time hunting together 
just three weeks after the Court agreed to hear Cheney’s appeal). 
33 Id. 
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Based on judges’ responses to seven scenarios that simulate the kinds 
of decisions that judges make (insofar as is possible given the limits of 
the experimental setting), we found that some types of highly rele-
vant, but inadmissible, evidence influenced the judges’ decisions.  We 
also found, however, that the judges were able to resist the influence 
of such information in at least some cases, namely those directly im-
plicating constitutional rights. 
Our Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we examine the psycho-
logical research on ignoring relevant information.  We observe that 
people have difficulty deliberately disregarding information, and we 
identify three explanations for this phenomenon.  We then discuss 
what psychologists have learned about the impact of this phenomenon 
on mock jurors.  In Part II, we introduce our study of this phenome-
non in trial judges.  In Part III, we provide the results of our experi-
ments.  We describe the seven scenarios we administered, report our 
findings, and briefly discuss the implications of the data we collected.  
In Part IV, we explore some of the broader ramifications of our study 
for the refinement of the justice system. 
Our research supports three tentative policy recommendations.  
First, we recommend that courts should separate “managerial judg-
ing”34 from adjudication.  In particular, a judge who supervises settle-
ment discussions should not serve as the fact finder in the same case.  
Second, we contend that jury trials should be favored over bench trials 
because judges can shield jurors from inadmissible information in 
ways that they cannot shield themselves.  Third, we suggest that guide-
lines or schedules should be adopted for amorphous categories of 
damages—like pain and suffering damages—in civil cases.  Such 
guidelines could structure and constrain judicial discretion and 
thereby limit the effect of inadmissible information encountered on 
judicial decision making. 
 
34 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982) (de-
scribing the “managerial” approach” that a growing number of judges have adopted, 
whereby judges not only adjudicate claims but also actively shape litigation, supervise 
case preparation, and influence results). 
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I.  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DELIBERATELY DISREGARDING 
People often forget or ignore important information, but they 
have difficulty doing so intentionally.35  Several theories might account 
for a failure to disregard information.36  First, people who face instruc-
tions to ignore information might not want to ignore it and might at-
tend to it even in the face of instructions to disregard it (motivation).  
Second, even if they want to ignore information, people might find it 
difficult to avoid thinking about information they want to ignore 
(ironic process theory).  Third, even if people can ignore the new in-
formation itself, the information might still affect their judgment:  in-
formation can influence the processing of subsequent events and can 
inspire beliefs that are not easily dispelled (mental contamination).  
Information quickly contaminates thinking because it affects how 
people process and store facts and beliefs.  Even if people ignore the 
initial information, its influence might still be felt.  These theories all 
suggest that suppressing the influence of information that is supposed 
to be ignored will be difficult.37  Research on deliberate forgetting 
supports this concern. 
A.  Motivation 
Motivation is critical to ignoring known information.  People who 
do not agree that the relevant information should be ignored are apt 
to rely on it when making a decision.  For example, jurors instructed 
to ignore a damning piece of evidence might well decide to rely on it 
anyway, doing a bit of rough justice by convicting a defendant they be-
lieve to be guilty.  People who are simply told to ignore relevant in-
formation are unlikely to do so without being provided an explanation 
as to why they should ignore the evidence.  Direct, but unexplained, 
 
35 See Hollyn M. Johnson, Processes of Successful Intentional Forgetting, 116 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 274, 274 (1994) (noting that the “success of intentional forgetting depends on 
how one originally encoded the to-be-forgotten information”). 
36 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding & Debra L. Long, There’s More to Intentional For-
getting than Directed Forgetting:  An Integrative Review, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 59, 93 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod 
eds., 1998) (reporting that “there is no consensus on the mechanisms that affect inten-
tional forgetting”). 
37 For a different taxonomy of the theoretical explanations for this phenomenon, 
see Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wagner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 59, 66-69 (2000). 
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instructions to disregard relevant information might well go un-
heeded. 
Indeed, research on “psychological reactance” indicates that in-
structions to ignore information might increase people’s desire to at-
tend to it.38  “Reactance occurs when decision makers feel that their 
freedom of choice is threatened and they respond by acting in ways 
that will restore their sense of decision-making freedom . . . . [M]ore 
severe restrictions on decision-making freedom are more likely to 
arouse reactance.”39  Most people refer to reactance as “reverse psy-
chology.”  The basic idea is that when an individual is told to do some-
thing that limits her freedom, she may rebel against that direction to 
restore her own sense of autonomy.  In studies of consumer behavior, 
for example, eliminating an option that had been available as a choice 
increases its attractiveness.40  Reactance can be particularly strong in 
people who face instructions on how to think.  In one study, individu-
als who initially supported a particular position largely reversed them-
selves when told that they “ha[d] no choice” but to agree with that po-
sition.41 
In the context of a trial, jurors might view instructions to ignore 
evidence as an unwarranted intrusion on their ability to decide a case 
as they see fit.42  “Responding to this threat to their freedom, jurors 
may not only be motivated to ignore the instruction to disregard the 
 
38 See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 18 (1966) (“[I]f a 
specific behavioral freedom of a person is eliminated by impersonal events, he will ex-
perience reactance and consequently will see increased attractiveness in the eliminated 
behavior.” (emphasis omitted)).  See generally SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE:  A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981) (reviewing 
the theory of psychological reactance). 
39 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:  
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 356 (1999). 
 40 See, e.g., Jack W. Brehm, Lloyd K. Stires, John Sensenig & Janet Shaban, The At-
tractiveness of an Eliminated Choice Alternative, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 306 
(1966) (reporting results of an experiment indicating that when a particular choice of 
a selection of music was suddenly eliminated from the options available, it became 
more attractive). 
 41 Melvin L. Snyder & Robert A. Wicklund, Prior Exercise of Freedom and Reactance, 12 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122-23 (1976). 
42 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1865 (2001) (explaining that reactance theory posits that 
“jurors see the admonition as an attempt to restrict their freedom to weigh and evalu-
ate probative evidence in reaching their verdict”). 
  
1262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1251 
 
inadmissible evidence, but may even focus more attention on the evi-
dence they were instructed to ignore.”43 
B.  Ironic Process Theory 
Motivation aside, suppressing known information presents a chal-
lenging cognitive task.  Refraining from thinking unwanted thoughts 
is so difficult that it can produce an “ironic process” in which people 
ultimately spend even more time thinking about thoughts they are try-
ing to suppress.44  When people attempt to suppress a thought, they 
monitor their mental activity to verify that suppression is proceeding 
successfully.  To do so, however, they must keep the forbidden 
thought available so that they can compare it to their existing mental 
state and confirm that they are not thinking the forbidden thought.45  
As psychologists describe it: 
[A]ttempts to influence mental states require monitoring processes that 
are sensitive to the failure of the attempts . . . . [W]hen efforts to imple-
ment the intended mental control are undermined in any way, the moni-
toring process itself will surface and ironically overwhelm the intended 
control to yield the opposite of the mental state that is desired.
46
 
Thought suppression, then, is an “ironic” process in that “[t]he inten-
tion to suppress a thought creates the opposite of what is wanted.”47 
Researchers have used the following example to illustrate the 
ironic process theory: 
[A]n alcoholic who is struggling to keep thoughts of an icy, cold beer 
completely out of mind may at various points say to himself or herself, “I 
haven’t thought about having a beer for the last 5 hours.”  Of course, 
upon making such an observation, the person has thought of the entic-
ing beverage.  This monitoring of potential intrusions of an unwanted 
 
43 Id.; see also Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions:  Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pre-
trial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 703 (2000) 
(“It may frequently be that jurors are motivated to maintain their freedom, and thus 
the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions can be explained by the provocation of reac-
tance.”). 
44 Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34 
(1994). 
45 See id. (describing the difficulty people experience when trying to suppress 
thoughts). 
46 Id. 
47 Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 908 (1992). 
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thought paradoxically keeps the thought accessible to consciousness and 
may lead to a rebound effect, or a resurgence of the thought following 
attempts to suppress it . . . .
48
 
In one memorable experiment illustrating ironic processing,49 re-
searchers instructed undergraduates participating in an elaborate 
study “not to think of a white bear.”50  The participants had great diffi-
culty carrying out this seemingly simple task.  They reported that they 
thought about a white bear “more than once per minute even when 
directly instructed to try not to think of a white bear.”51  Furthermore, 
efforts to suppress thoughts of a white bear increased the rate at which 
participants reported thoughts of a white bear in a subsequent “free” 
session in which they were asked only to report thoughts of a white 
bear (but not actively suppress them).  The study suggests two princi-
ples of the human mind that make it difficult to ignore relevant mate-
rial:  first, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore even an arbitrary 
and unremarkable image like a white bear; second, efforts to suppress 
thoughts about a subject might actually produce more thoughts about 
that subject. 
Efforts to control thought processes are subject to both cognitive 
and motivational limitations that make the task difficult and can lead 
to ironic results.  Whether the thought is of a white bear, a rhinoc-
eros,52 a hippopotamus,53 or an inadmissible confession, people cannot 
 
48 Anita E. Kelly & Margaret M. Nauta, Reactance and Thought Suppression, 23 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1123, 1123 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
49 Daniel M. Wegner, David J. Schneider, Samuel R. Carter III & Teri L. White, 
Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1987) 
(discussing an experiment in which students were “randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions, an initial suppression condition or an initial expression con-
dition” (emphases omitted)). 
50 Id. at 6-7. 
51 Id. at 7. 
52 See Lang v. Kohl’s Food Stores, Inc., 217 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2000) (compar-
ing a hypothetical judicial instruction ordering jurors to disregard a report to “telling 
the jurors that for the remainder of the trial none of them was allowed to say the word 
‘rhinoceros’ to himself”). 
53 According to the Seventh Circuit: 
We do not pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind without think-
ing about the other.  An instruction told the jury to do this, but this is like tell-
ing someone not to think about a hippopotamus.  To tell someone not to 
think about the beast is to assure at least a fleeting mental image.  So it is here.  
Each juror must have had both the legitimate and the forbidden considera-
tions somewhere in mind, if only in the subconscious. 
United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).  
The court went on to describe the unwelcome consequences of admitting evidence of 
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easily successfully implement a decision to refrain from thinking a 
particular thought.  Efforts to control the thoughts of others might 
also induce people to resist such efforts actively.  In short, people 
might not want to suppress thoughts and might not be able to do so, 
even if they try. 
C.  Mental Contamination 
The prevailing view of belief formation, associated with Descartes, 
posits that people form beliefs by first comprehending a piece of in-
formation and then freely deciding whether to accept it as accurate or 
dismiss it as inaccurate.54  An alternate view, associated with Spinoza, 
posits that people initially accept as accurate every proposition they 
comprehend and then decide whether to “unbelieve” it.55  Building on 
Spinoza’s work, psychologists argue that misleading or inaccurate in-
formation produces a “mental contamination” that persists even after 
people become aware that the information is misleading or inaccu-
rate.56  This “unconscious or uncontrollable mental processing . . . re-
sults in unwanted judgments, emotions, or behavior.”57  The brain 
does not store information in isolated units, but in a connected whole.  
Information thus influences how the brain processes new stimuli.  
New information also facilitates the construction of beliefs that might 
persist, even if the information is discredited. 
 
other wrongs because the “bad character” inference is frequently inseparable from the 
“bad intent” inference.  Id. 
54 See Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 167, 180 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Dan-
iel Kahneman eds., 2002) (“[Descartes] was the first to suggest that understanding and 
believing are separate and sequential psychological operations.”); see also Daniel T. Gil-
bert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 108 (1991) (describing 
Descartes’ philosophy). 
55 See Gilbert, Inferential Correction, supra note 54, at 180 (“[Spinoza] argued that 
understanding and believing are a single mental operation.  [He] suggested that hu-
man beings believe assertions as part of understanding them, and that they then ‘unbe-
lieve’ those assertions that are found to be at odds with other established facts.”); see 
also Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, supra note 54, at 108 (describing Spinoza’s phi-
losophy). 
56 Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination 
and the Debiasing Program, in HEURISTICS & BIASES, supra note 54, at 185, 185; see also 
Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:  Un-
wanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117 (1994) (de-
scribing “mental contamination”). 
57 Wilson, Centerbar & Brekke, supra note 56, at 185. 
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What makes mental contamination particularly pernicious is that 
it can operate outside of conscious thought.58  People might not even 
realize how new information has affected their judgment and are thus 
ill-equipped to contain its influence.  Consequently, merely suppress-
ing thoughts of the unwanted information will not prevent it from af-
fecting judgment.  “[T]he failure to appreciate the perils of mental 
contamination may lead people to design decision-making systems”—
including the American legal system—“that are destined to produce 
biased judgments.”59 
1.  Contaminated Information Processing 
Insulating a decision-making process from inadmissible informa-
tion requires preventing this information from influencing how sub-
sequent information is processed.  This can be challenging because 
information changes how we think.  It creates beliefs that can guide 
the integration and assessment of subsequent information.  In the jar-
gon of social cognition, information can activate a schema, or organiz-
ing principle.  An activated schema colors how we think in every way.  
It makes some memories and beliefs more available than others.60  It 
also guides attention and interpretation of new information.  Sup-
pressing the influence of information thus requires both suppressing 
the new information and suppressing the influence of the scheme on 
processing of subsequent information. 
Consider the following example.  What activity does the following 
paragraph describe? 
The procedure is actually quite simple.  First you arrange things into dif-
ferent groups depending on their makeup.  Of course, one pile may be 
sufficient depending on how much there is to do.  If you have to go 
somewhere else due to lack of facilities that is the next step, otherwise 
you are pretty well set.  It is important not to overdo any particular en-
deavor.  That is, it is better to do too few things at once than too many.  
In the short run this may not seem important, but complications from 
doing too many can easily arise.  A mistake can be expensive as well.  The 
manipulation of the appropriate mechanisms should be self-explanatory, 
 
58 See id. (“[P]eople have poor access to the processes by which they form their 
judgments . . . .”). 
59 Id. at 196. 
60 See John D. Bransford & Marcia K. Johnson, Contextual Prerequisites for Understand-
ing:  Some Investigations of Comprehension and Recall, 11 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL 
BEHAV. 717, 718-22 (1972) (concluding that contextual information impacts the inter-
pretation of new information). 
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and we need not dwell on it here.  At first the whole procedure will seem 
complicated.  Soon, however, it will become just another facet of life.  It 
is difficult to foresee any end to this task in the immediate future, but 
then one never can tell.61 
Now suppose you learn that the passage is entitled “washing clothes.”  
It is inconceivable that you can read the passage with the same under-
standing of its meaning after learning the title.  The title triggers a 
psychological schema that inevitably organizes the flow of the infor-
mation in the passage.  Knowing the title influences what people re-
member about the passage and how they think about it.  The influ-
ence of knowing the title is impossible to suppress effectively. 
The profound influence of activated schemata underlies the dra-
matic effect of first impressions.  Solomon Asch provided one of the 
most compelling demonstrations of this almost sixty years ago.62  Asch 
read subjects one of two sets of adjectives said to describe an individ-
ual’s personality: 
A.  intelligent-–industrious-–impulsive-–critical–-stubborn–-envious 
B.  envious–-stubborn–-critical–-impulsive-–industrious–-intelligent
63
 
As Asch reported: 
 The two series are identical . . . differing only in the order . . . . 
 . . . The impression produced by A is predominantly that of an able 
person who possesses certain shortcomings which do not, however, over-
shadow his merits.  On the other hand, B impresses [most subjects] as a 
“problem,” whose abilities are hampered by his serious difficulties. . . . 
[S]ome of the qualities (e.g., impulsiveness, criticalness) are interpreted 
in a positive way under Condition A, while they take on, under Condition 
B, a negative color.
64
 
The initial adjectives color the assessment of ambiguous adjectives that 
follow.  The same cognitive process is thought to underlie the widely 
documented social phenomenon of “halo effects.”65  Halo effects are 
the tendency to assume that like goes with like:  that beautiful or tall 
 
61 Id. at 722. 
62 S.E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSCYHOL. 258 
(1946). 
63 Id. at 270 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 See Seymour Rosenberg & Karen Olshan, Evaluative and Descriptive Aspects in Per-
sonality Perception, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 619, 619-21 (1970) (reviewing 
studies of halo effects in judgments of character). 
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people are nice, smart, and capable, while ugly and short people are 
mean, dumb, and incapable.  Salient information (such as height or 
attractiveness) activates positive or negative associations that color how 
people process everything else they learn about an individual. 
When information affects how people think about subsequent in-
formation, suppressing its influence on judgment will be most chal-
lenging.  The organizing schemata that information triggers can be 
invisible, making it hard to know what would have been different had 
the information not been available. 
2.  Belief Perseverance 
As the mind continues to dwell on the information to be forgot-
ten, it elaborates on that information and incorporates it into an intri-
cate belief system which in turn affects subsequent information proc-
essing.  Social psychologists call this “belief perseverance.”66  When 
people acquire new information, they quickly incorporate it into their 
knowledge that they already possess.  Once they have done so, they are 
likely to have great difficulty undoing the beliefs that the information 
inspired.67 
Social psychologist Lee Ross and his colleagues were the first to 
demonstrate belief perseverance directly.68  They gave undergraduate 
subjects the grisly task of evaluating ten suicide notes.  They informed 
the subjects that five were actual suicide notes and that five had been 
created for the experiment.  The subjects ostensibly had to identify 
the real notes.  Afterwards, the experimenters told some of the sub-
jects that they had performed well at the task (scoring nine out of ten 
right) and others that they had performed poorly (scoring below fifty 
percent).  Later, the experimenters informed the subjects that, in fact, 
all of the notes were fakes.  The subjects then had to estimate how well 
they would perform a real version of such a task.  Subjects who had 
 
66 See generally Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-
Perception and Social Perception:  Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975).  Another way of thinking about this phe-
nomenon is that once individuals encounter information, it may become part of a 
“schema” or organizing principle that influences how they subsequently evaluate addi-
tional information. 
67 See Saul M. Kassin & Christina A. Studebaker, Instructions to Disregard and the Jury:  
Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING, supra note 36, at 413, 415 
(“[I]nstructions to disregard may fail when the discredited information has already ac-
tivated the formation of a theory or explanatory structure.”). 
68 Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, supra note 66, at 884-88. 
  
1268 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1251 
 
been told that they had performed well indicated that they would do 
well, subjects who had been told that they had performed badly indi-
cated that they would do poorly.  Even though they knew that the 
feedback they had received was completely bogus, the beliefs they had 
formed about their capabilities persisted.  In large part, this belief per-
severance resulted from the subjects’ tendency to try to explain to 
themselves why they had performed well or poorly.  For example, one 
subject, told she had done well, stated that she had concluded she was 
good at evaluating suicide notes because she enjoyed the poetry of 
Sylvia Plath, who had killed herself.  Even though the feedback she 
had received was discredited, her new beliefs persisted. 
In another study of belief perseverance analogous to a courtroom 
setting, researchers recruited students to participate in a purported 
“creativity” assessment.69  Unbeknownst to the participants, the re-
searchers also recruited confederates.  The confederates provided 
negative information to several of the participants about a teaching 
assistant involved in the study.  Later, the researchers asked all of the 
participants to rate the teaching assistant on a scale from one (least 
nice) to ten (nicest).  The researchers assigned the participants to 
four groups:  a control group and three experimental groups (Groups 
Two, Three, and Four).  Participants in the control group did not re-
ceive the negative information about the teaching assistant and gave 
her a mean rating of 9.33 on the researchers’ “niceness” scale.70  Par-
ticipants in Group Two, who heard the negative information about the 
teaching assistant, gave her a significantly lower rating of 6.58.71  Par-
ticipants in Group Three heard the negative information but were in-
structed by the confederate to disregard it because “I probably 
shouldn’t have told you those things.”72  They gave the teaching assis-
tant a mean rating of 6.71.73  Group Four participants heard the nega-
tive information but were instructed by the confederate to disregard it 
because “that wasn’t the [teaching assistant], it was someone else 
[whom I was thinking about].”74  They gave the teaching assistant a 
 
69 Jonathan M. Golding & Jerry Hauselt, When Instructions to Forget Become Instruc-
tions to Remember, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 178, 180 (1994). 
70 Id. at 182 tbl.1. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 181. 
73 Id. at 182 tbl.1. 
74 Id. at 181. 
 
2005] CAN JUDGES IGNORE INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION? 1269 
 
mean rating of 8.09, still well below the rating given by the control 
group participants.75 
In this study, the negative information to which the participants 
were exposed continued to affect their evaluation of the teaching as-
sistant even when they were told to forget it.  Moreover, the effective-
ness of the instruction to disregard the information was greater when 
the confederate discredited the information by explaining that it was 
incorrect than when the confederate asked the participants to forget 
the information simply because she should not have revealed it to 
them.  Telling the participants that the information was incorrect did 
not neutralize its effect on judgment, however.  Subjects who had re-
ceived discredited negative information still rated the teaching assis-
tant as less nice than those subjects in the control group, who were not 
exposed to the negative information. 
Belief perseverance illustrates a critical impediment to ignoring 
known information.  Information triggers a cascade of thoughts as 
part of the brain’s effort to construct and to maintain a coherent set of 
beliefs.  Merely ignoring the information itself is not enough.  The in-
ferences that explain and accommodate the information into an inte-
grated picture of the world must also be ignored, or the information 
will affect decision making indirectly.76 
The rapid integration of information into a coherent story that 
produces belief perseverance also produces a related phenomenon, 
the hindsight bias.  The hindsight bias refers to the tendency for the 
past to seem more predictable than it actually was.77  It occurs largely 
because once events unfold, the mind automatically makes inferences 
based upon its knowledge of the outcome.  When viewed in this light, 
antecedent events that are likely to have produced the actual outcome 
seem more significant than those that were likely to have produced 
different outcomes.  Consequently, people think the actual outcome 
was more predictable or foreseeable than it was.  The hindsight bias is 
thus one instance in which people cannot ignore known information.  
The fact that the particular outcome occurred cannot easily be ig-
nored, even when people are asked to do so. 
 
75 Id. at 182 tbl.1. 
76 See Bransford & Johnson, supra note 60, at 717-18 (relating the influence of 
deep structure and integration of experiences on comprehension of a sentence). 
77 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind-
sight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (explaining the hindsight bias and its presence in 
the legal system). 
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Both contaminated information processing and belief persever-
ance have obvious implications for efforts to disregard inadmissible 
evidence.  Inadmissible evidence presented early in a trial might affect 
how juries and judges organize and interpret evidence presented later, 
thereby contaminating their decision-making processes.  Inadmissible 
evidence presented late in a trial might cause juries and judges to re-
assess their evaluation of the evidence that preceded it.  Thus, even if 
a fact finder can avoid using inadmissible evidence directly, the asso-
ciations and inferences that flow naturally from that inadmissible evi-
dence can still affect judgment indirectly. 
D.  Disregarding Information in a Legal Setting: 
Mock Jury Studies 
Many researchers have investigated whether mock jurors are able 
to disregard inadmissible evidence in experiments involving trial-like 
settings.  With one notable exception,78 this work has not examined 
judges.  Nevertheless, this research could suggest mechanisms that fa-
cilitate or impede judges’ ability to ignore known information. 
One of the earliest such experiments asked adults eligible for jury 
service to listen to a tape recording of a hypothetical trial in a negli-
gence case in which the plaintiff had been injured when the car in 
which she was a passenger collided with a car driven by the defen-
dant.79  The subjects were divided into three groups of juries.  The 
three groups reviewed the same trial materials except for variations in 
a discussion of the defendant’s insurance coverage.  In all cases, liabil-
ity was reasonably clear; in fact, of the thirty mock juries studied, 
twenty-eight found for the plaintiff, one jury hung, and one found for 
the defendant.80  The first group learned that the defendant had no 
insurance—a fact admitted into evidence without objection.  These 
juries awarded the plaintiff an average of $33,000.81  The second group 
learned that the defendant had insurance—a fact also admitted into 
evidence without objection.  These juries awarded the plaintiff an av-
 
78 Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effects of Po-
tentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 
(1994) (discussed infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text). 
79 Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 753-54 
(1959). 
80 Id. at 754. 
81 Id. 
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erage of $37,000.82  The third group learned that the defendant had 
insurance, but it also heard an objection to that evidence, and was in-
structed by the judge to disregard it.  The third group of juries 
awarded the plaintiff an average of $46,000.83 
This experiment suggests that the rule excluding evidence of a de-
fendant’s insurance serves its intended purpose.  If juries are in-
formed that the defendant has insurance, the damage award will tend 
to be higher if liability is found.84  The second important lesson of the 
experiment, however, is less encouraging.  An instruction to disregard 
such evidence might induce jurors to give the evidence more weight 
than they otherwise would.  The author of the experiment concluded 
that the “fuss” made over the defendant’s insurance emphasized the 
fact that the defendant was insured.85 
The results of this early experiment were partly confirmed by a 
more recent experiment based upon a hypothetical criminal trial.86  
Researchers gave college students a summary of a criminal case in 
which the defendant was charged with murdering his estranged wife 
and a male neighbor.  The evidence against the defendant was weak.  
The researchers divided the subjects into four groups.  The only dif-
ference across the four groups was whether inculpatory statements 
made by the defendant during a tape-recorded telephone call to a 
friend were presented, and if so, how the judge reacted to the inculpa-
tory statements.  The wiretap evidence was not presented to the first 
group, and twenty-four percent of the subjects in that group found the 
defendant guilty.87  The wiretap evidence was presented to the second 
group, and was ruled admissible over the defendant’s objection.  This 
produced a seventy-nine percent conviction rate among the subjects in 
the second group.88  The wiretap evidence was also presented to the 
 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Whether damage awards would be unfairly high if jurors were informed that the 
defendant had insurance, or whether they would be unfairly low if they were not so in-
formed, is a separate issue.  For present purposes it suffices to point out that conceal-
ing the defendant’s insurance coverage does tend to reduce damage awards, whether 
for good or for ill. 
85 Broeder, supra note 79, at 754. 
86 Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disre-
gard, and the Jury:  Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1047-53 (1997). 
87 Id. at 1049. 
88 Id. 
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third and fourth groups, both of which were instructed to disregard it, 
albeit for different reasons.  The third group was told that the defen-
dant’s objection was sustained, and that the evidence should be disre-
garded because it had been illegally obtained without a warrant.  Fifty-
five percent of the subjects in the third group found the defendant 
guilty.89  The fourth group was told that the objection was sustained, 
and the evidence should be disregarded because the audio tape of the 
telephone call was so inaudible that it could not be determined what 
was said.  Twenty-four percent of the subjects in the fourth group 
found the defendant guilty.90 
Contrary to the results of the previous experiment, this experi-
ment suggests that inadmissible evidence receives less weight than 
admissible evidence.  The results are inconsistent with the results in 
the experiment based on the hypothetical civil trial, which suggest 
that excluding evidence caused it to be valued more highly than did 
admitting the same evidence.91  On the other hand, this experiment 
shows a difference in the effect of excluding evidence depending 
upon the nature of the reason given for the exclusion.  The subjects in 
group three were told that the evidence was inadmissible because it 
had been illegally obtained without a warrant.  Although the wiretap 
evidence influenced them less than it did the subjects in group two, 
who were told that the evidence was admissible, the subjects in group 
three were more influenced by the wiretap evidence than were the 
subjects in group four, who were told that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble because it was unreliable.  This study suggests that the reason 
given for exclusion matters.  Minimizing the influence of the inadmis-
sible information might require emphasizing the unreliability of the 
evidence rather than merely its failure to comply with technical legal 
standards.  This experiment also suggests that if the reason for exclu-
sion is compelling, an instruction to disregard the inadmissible evi-
dence allows the decision maker to behave almost as if she had never 
been exposed to the information.92 
The divergent outcomes of the numerous other experiments con-
ducted on the ability of mock jurors to deliberately disregard inadmis-
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
92 But see Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence:  A Legal 
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 415 (1995) (concluding that a le-
gal explanation did not help jurors disregard inadmissible evidence). 
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sible evidence, however, present a more confusing picture than these 
two studies suggest.  Some studies replicate the “boomerang” effect 
found in the early study involving insurance coverage in a tort case.93  
Others conclude that instructions to ignore have no effect.94  Others 
 
93 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (describing this experiment).  For 
other studies documenting the boomerang effect, see Russell D. Clark, III, The Role of 
Censorship in Minority Influence, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335-36 (1994) (support-
ing experimentally the proposition that attempts to censor a minority message will ac-
tually increase the influence of that minority); Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effect of 
Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials:  An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibil-
ity, 4 SOC. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1989) (demonstrating that for “limited use evidence . . . the 
limiting instruction [may] produce[] a ‘backfire’ effect, in that judgments were actu-
ally harsher with instructions than without”); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, 
Researching the Hearsay Rule:  Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 655, 661-62 (1992) (finding that mock jurors disregarded specific hear-
say despite being told to consider it, but with a limiting instruction); John C. Reinard & 
Rodney A. Reynolds, The Effects of Inadmissible Testimony Objections and Rulings on Jury 
Decisions, 15 J. AM. FORENSIC ASS’N 91, 98 (1978) (finding that jurors only considered 
the inadmissible testimony when an objection was made, regardless of whether it was 
sustained or not); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and 
Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
477, 484-85 (1987) (noting that limiting instructions directing jurors not to consider a 
past perjury conviction when assigning blame actually resulted in more assignment of 
blame than when no limiting instruction was given). 
94 See, e.g., A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of 
S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 94-95 (1972) (finding 
that the judge’s instructions to limit the use of previous conviction evidence “had no 
effect whatsoever on the decisions of the [test] subjects”); Edith Greene & Mary 
Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 67, 73 (1995) (“Apparently, jurors’ use of information about a defendant’s le-
gal history was not affected by instructions on the appropriate use of that informa-
tion.”); Edith Greene & Elizabeth Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 193, 203-04 (1985) (finding that a limiting instruction had no significant effect 
on the jury, except to “lower [the] guiltiness rating on a lesser included offense”); Saul 
M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instruction, and Mock 
Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 494-95 (1982) (“[T]he instruction ma-
nipulation had no effect on verdicts.”); Gregory E. Lenehan & Patrick O’Neill, Reac-
tance and Conflict as Determinants of Judgment in a Mock Jury Experiment, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 231, 237 (1981) (finding that when the judge gave a limiting instruction on 
evidence relating to an inconsequential witness, the limiting instruction had no effect); 
Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence:  The Effects of Type and 
Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 512 (1998) (finding only marginal 
differences in results whether or not hearsay instructions were given); Stanley Sue, 
Ronald E. Smith & Renee Gilbert, Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 
J. CRIM. JUST. 163, 168-70 (1973) (finding that the judge’s instruction to disregard pre-
trial publicity had no significant effect on whether mock jurors rendered a guilty ver-
dict); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases:  The Impact of Im-
peachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 SOC. BEHAV. 165, 170 (1987) 
(finding that instructions limiting the use of prior perjury convictions had no signifi-
cant effect on the degree of responsibility assigned); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, 
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indicate that mock jurors might have some ability to ignore inadmissi-
ble information.95  Still others indicate that mock jurors can com-
pletely ignore information deemed inadmissible.96  Finally, some even 
 
Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 453, 462, 465 (1982) (indicating that an “instruction was partially effective, 
since there were no differences between joined (with instructions) and single condi-
tions”); William C. Thompson, Geoffrey T. Fong & D.L. Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence 
and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 457 (1981) (finding no ef-
fect from the judge’s instructions limiting either proacquittal or proconviction evi-
dence); Rosell L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:  
When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43-
44 (1985) (finding that, despite an instruction to limit the use of a prior conviction 
only to assess credibility, “credibility judgments were unaffected by [the] prior convic-
tion condition”). 
95 See W.R. Cornish & A.P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 
208, 222 (“Contrary to common supposition, juries give real weight to an instruction to 
disregard relevant previous record wrongly admitted.”); Steven Fein, Allison L. 
McCloskey & Thomas M. Tomlinson, Can the Jury Disregard That Information?  The Use of 
Suspicion to Reduce the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1223 (1997) (suggesting that jurors given 
reason to be suspicious of inadmissible evidence will discount it); Jonathan L. Freed-
man, Christiane K. Martin & Victor L. Mota, Pretrial Publicity:  Effects of Admonition and 
Expressing Pretrial Opinions, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 255, 260-61 (1998) 
(finding that an admonition not to base the decision on outside facts or discussion had 
a significant effect on jurors’ willingness to find guilt); Kassin & Sommers, supra note 
86, at 1049 (finding that jurors considered evidence that was ruled inadmissible on due 
process grounds, but did not consider the same evidence that was ruled inadmissible 
on reliability grounds); Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries:  
The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL.  153, 158 (1994) (finding that jurors are more likely to follow the 
judge’s instruction when meeting as a jury than when simply voting for guilt or inno-
cence on their own); Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on 
Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 934, 936 
(2000) (finding that a significant percentage of jurors who heard a due process limit-
ing instruction changed their minds from guilty to not guilty during deliberations); 
Pickel, supra note 92, at 414, 418 (finding that inadmissible evidence was more likely to 
not be considered when no explanation was given for the limiting instruction, rather 
than when the judge explained the reason); Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod & Rebecca 
Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials:  The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evi-
dence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319, 328-29 (1985) 
(finding that instructions designed to eliminate prejudice with regard to joined 
charges had a significant effect on jurors’ results); Carol M. Werner, Dorothy K. Kage-
hiro & Michael J. Strube, Conviction Proneness and the Authoritarian Juror:  Inability to Dis-
regard Information or Attitudinal Bias?, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 631-32 (1982) (find-
ing that less authoritarian people were less likely to use inadmissible evidence to 
convict the accused). 
96 See Cox & Tanford, supra note 93, at 38-39 (“[T]he curative instruction appears 
to alleviate the harm produced by the introduction of inadmissible evidence.”); 
Monique A. Fleming, Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Procedural and Legal Moti-
vations to Correct for Perceived Judicial Biases, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 186, 194-
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show that mock jurors overcompensate in reaction to inadmissible 
evidence; that is, those exposed to the inadmissible information and 
told to disregard it make decisions that are even more favorable to the 
party that requested the instruction to disregard than the subjects who 
were not exposed to the inadmissible information.97 
Even the mechanisms that might underlie these effects are in dis-
pute.  Some studies suggest that providing a reason why the evidence 
is inadmissible is helpful,98 while others reveal this to be useless.99  
Similarly, some indicate that deliberation enhances the effectiveness 
of instructions to ignore,100 but others suggest that deliberations make 
things worse.101 
Can any generalizations be safely made?  First, when people at-
tempt to ignore inadmissible information of which they are aware in 
making decisions or arriving at judgments about other people, they 
frequently will be unsuccessful.102  Second, such attempts are more 
 
96 (1999) (suggesting that even if jurors do not change their private perceptions upon 
hearing evidence is inadmissible, they do change how they vote). 
97 See, e.g., Evelyn Goldstein Schaefer & Kristine L. Hansen, Similar Fact Evidence 
and Limited Use Instructions:  An Empirical Investigation, 14 CRIM. L.J. 157, 170 (1990) 
(finding that receiving a limited use instruction greatly reduced the likelihood that a 
juror would vote to convict); Samuel R. Sommers & Saul M. Kassin, On the Many Impacts 
of Inadmissible Testimony:  Selective Compliance, Need for Cognition, and the Overcorrection 
Bias, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1368, 1372-73 (2001) (finding that jurors 
with a high need for cognition were significantly more likely to exhibit bias overcorrec-
tion than were jurors with a lower need for cognition); Tanford & Cox, supra note 93, 
at 484 (finding that jurors who received character evidence of honesty, along with in-
structions to limit the use of a past perjury conviction, convicted the suspect at a far 
lower rate than those who were not informed of the perjury conviction). 
98 See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1046-47 (providing an explanation for 
why the inadmissible evidence facilitated mock jurors’ ability to ignore the evidence). 
99 See Pickel, supra note 92, at 414 (finding that an explanation of why evidence 
should be inadmissible had a significantly worse effect than providing no explanation 
at all). 
100 See Kerwin & Shaffer, supra note 95, at 158 (finding that deliberating juries were 
more able to follow instructions and disregard inadmissible evidence than individual 
jurors); London & Nunez, supra note 95, at 936 (same). 
101 See Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and 
the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 243 (1975) (finding that delibera-
tion increased the effect of inadmissible evidence on verdicts). 
102 See Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, supra note 49, at 6 (concluding that 
“conscious thought suppression is not a cognitive transformation that people perform 
with great facility”); see also id. (citing Donald V. McGranahan, A Critical and Experimen-
tal Study of Repression, 35 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212 (1940), among other stud-
ies, for the proposition that even the threat of electric shocks did not deter subjects 
from making forbidden color associations with stimulus words). 
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likely to be successful (a) if the inadmissible information is not 
needed to arrive at a sound decision;103 (b) if the inadmissible infor-
mation is not highly salient or emotionally charged;104 (c) if the deci-
sion maker is not simultaneously subjected to heavy extraneous cogni-
tive load;105 or, most importantly, (d) if the credibility of the 
inadmissible information sought to be ignored is destroyed or at least 
called into question.106  Finally, attempting to ignore inadmissible in-
formation might backfire or rebound, with the paradoxical result that 
the inadmissible information becomes more influential than it would 
have been in the absence of such an attempt.107 
 
103 See Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & Cathy Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence 
on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors:  A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 351 
(1973) (concluding that where the evidence was weak, an inadmissible inculpatory 
tape recording biased jurors and the judge’s admonishment to disregard it was ineffec-
tive, but when the evidence against the defendant was strong, the inadmissible inculpa-
tory tape recording had no effect on the verdict, regardless of what the judge did). 
104 See, e.g., Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instruc-
tions to Disregard:  The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 849, 856 (1997) (“[I]t is the capacity of information to elicit emotion 
that renders it particularly difficult to ignore in the context of making judgments.”). 
105 See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 44, at 35 (arguing that “mental control exerted 
during mental load will often produce ironic effects, resulting in mental states that go 
beyond ‘no change’ to become the opposite of what is desired”); Daniel M. Wegner, 
Ralph Erber & Sophia Zanakos, Ironic Processes in the Mental Control of Mood and Mood-
Related Thought, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1093, 1101 (1993) (concluding 
that subjects failed mental control tasks when they were assigned other mental tasks to 
perform simultaneously). 
106 See, e.g., Fein, McCloskey & Tomlinson, supra note 95, at 1223 (reporting that 
exposure to incriminating information in the form of either pretrial publicity or inad-
missible testimony negatively influenced individuals’ judgments about the defendant 
regardless of whether the subjects were instructed to disregard the information, but 
further reporting that creating suspicion about the motives underlying the disclosure 
of the incriminating information mitigated or eliminated its impact).  But see Fleming, 
Wegener & Petty, supra note 96, at 197 (suggesting that concerns about procedural un-
fairness can influence decision makers to disregard information even at the cost of di-
minishing accuracy). 
107 Although some studies find this effect, others do not.  Compare Broeder, supra 
note 79, at 754 (finding such an effect), and Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Ef-
fects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments 
of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 216 (1977) (same), with Sue, Smith & 
Caldwell, supra note 103, at 350-51 (not finding such an effect). 
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II.  THE STUDY 
A.  Introduction 
Previous studies shed light on juror decision making, but what 
about judges?  Without denigrating the important role that jurors play 
in the legal system, we have argued previously that “judges are much 
more important than juries.”108  After all, about one-third of all civil 
trials are bench trials,109 and judges “determine the outcome of 
roughly seven times as many cases as juries by ruling on dispositive 
motions, and they often play an active role in settling cases.  Even in 
those cases that juries decide, judges preside.”110 
For several reasons, judges might be better able than jurors to dis-
regard inadmissible information.  Judges are generally better edu-
cated than jurors, and thus might have superior abilities to perform 
this difficult cognitive task.  Moreover, judges have legal training that 
probably makes them more likely than jurors to appreciate the pur-
pose, importance, and desirability of the exclusionary rules.  For 
judges, exclusionary rules are also apt to present a less jarring in-
fringement on sensible decision making.  Finally, judges have substan-
tial experience making legal decisions.  Judges might thus be better 
able to compartmentalize admissible evidence from inadmissible evi-
dence and to limit their decisions to the contents of the formal re-
cord.111 
 
108 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 781 (2001). 
109 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 143-44 (2002); see also LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS:  
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 162-64 tbl.C-7 (2003) (reporting 2603 civil jury tri-
als and 3227 civil nonjury trials during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 
2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html; Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:  Transcending Empiricism, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 n.7 (1992) (noting two surveys where 55.5% of federal 
civil trials and about 96% of state civil trials were judge trials). 
110 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 781 (footnotes omitted). 
111 A number of psychology studies have examined the strategies necessary to ex-
clude undesirable thoughts, such as those regarding impermissible evidence, from the 
decision-making process.  See Anita E. Kelley & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Effects of Suppression of 
Personal Intrusive Thoughts, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 998, 1004 (1994) (sug-
gesting that people who are experienced in suppressing intrusive thoughts may be able 
to do so by tapping into a network of effective distractors allowing them to avoid the 
rebound effect after the suppression period); see also Richard M. Wenzlaff & Danielle 
E. Bates, The Relative Efficacy of Concentration and Suppression Strategies of Mental Control, 
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1200, 1210-11 (2000) (“[A] positive mental 
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On the other hand, judges might not perform better than jurors—
and might even perform worse—for several reasons.  Judges are likely 
to be exposed to significantly more inadmissible information than ju-
rors, in particular, information that jurors never hear or see.  Addi-
tionally, judges might be confident that they can disregard inadmissi-
ble information.112  Because of this, they may be disinclined to 
undertake the extra effort necessary to avoid coming into contact with 
inadmissible evidence and are therefore particularly susceptible to 
“mental contamination.”113  Finally, most trial judges act alone.  Often, 
they have little, if any, opportunity for group deliberation with their 
peers.  This kind of deliberation is the hallmark of the jury decision-
making process, and though the evidence is mixed, some studies do 
suggest that deliberations can improve jurors’ ability to disregard in-
admissible information.114  Thus, even if judges perform as well as or 
better than jurors, they may not perform as well as juries.115 
We set out to assess these competing claims empirically.  Despite 
the dozens of prior studies on mock jurors, the ability of judges to dis-
regard inadmissible evidence has been assessed in only one prior ex-
perimental study.116  This study showed that judges were unable to dis-
regard evidence that a tort defendant had undertaken subsequent 
remedial measures, even when told that the previously assigned judge 
had ruled the evidence of those measures inadmissible.  The authors 
also found that the influence of the inadmissible evidence on judges 
 
control strategy emphasizing the pursuit of desirable thoughts is preferable to the tac-
tic of suppressing undesirable material.”). 
112 See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, 36 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1922) (“[W]e, the 
judges (of superior mentality) are able to discern and segregate those matters by which 
you, the jurors, might be led astray or biased.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
113 See supra Part I.C. 
114 See Kerwin & Shaffer, supra note 95, at 160 (reporting results suggesting that 
“deliberating juries were indeed less likely than individual jurors to recommend a ver-
dict that was tainted by testimony they had been instructed to ignore.”); id. at 161 
(“[A] generalization to juries based on the behavior of mock jurors can be a rather 
perilous one.”). 
115 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS:  WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, 
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 183-84 (2004) (noting Chandra Nemeth’s studies of mock 
juries as proof that “the presence of a minority viewpoint . . . makes a group’s decisions 
more nuanced and its decision-making process more rigorous,” even when the view-
point is “ill conceived”). 
116 See generally Landsman & Rakos, supra note 78 (examining reactions of judges 
and mock jurors to biasing information in a hypothetical case). 
 
2005] CAN JUDGES IGNORE INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION? 1279 
 
was comparable to its effect on a group of jury-eligible adults.117  While 
suggestive, the study presented only a single type of inadmissible evi-
dence.  Furthermore, to facilitate the comparison between lay persons 
and judges, the authors did not have the judges actually rule the evi-
dence inadmissible.  Normally, judges make their own rulings as to 
admissibility.  Given the role that psychological reactance is thought to 
play in the evaluation of inadmissible evidence,118 this could have ex-
aggerated the influence of the inadmissible evidence on judges.  
Hence, like that study’s authors, we regard it as helpful, but prelimi-
nary.  We undertook a more detailed assessment. 
B.  The Participating Judges 
We recruited a total of 265 sitting judges attending five judicial 
education conferences to participate in our study:  105 state trial court 
judges from Maricopa County, Arizona,119 62 federal magistrate judges 
 
117 See id. at 125 (“[J]udges and jurors in civil cases react similarly when exposed to 
material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible—their perceptions of central trial is-
sues are altered.”). 
118 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of psycho-
logical reactance on evidentiary considerations). 
119 Of the 105 judges in Maricopa County, 70 were superior court judges, 25 were 
court commissioners, one was an appellate judge, and two were administrative law 
judges. 
 The superior court judges from Maricopa County are the principal trial court 
judges in the county.  They generally rotate through several departments, including 
the civil, criminal, family, probate, and juvenile departments.  In some instances, how-
ever, the judges might remain in a department for longer periods of time.  In particu-
lar, the need for family court judges allows judges who want to adjudicate family cases 
to volunteer for this assignment indefinitely.  Thus, although most of the superior 
court judges in our study have experience in multiple areas, twelve of these judges re-
ported that they had presided exclusively over family court matters. 
 The Maricopa County Superior Court judges are appointed for fixed, renewable 
terms through a merit selection process mandated by the Arizona Constitution.  ARIZ. 
CONST., art. 6, § 37 (amended 1974 and 1992).  To obtain appointment to the bench, 
prospective judges are considered by a judicial nominating commission.  Id. § 37, cl. B.  
The nominating commission recommends at least three candidates to the governor, 
who then appoints the judges for fixed terms.  Id. § 37, cl. B, C.  Appointments are 
based primarily on merit.  See id. § 37, cl. C (“In making the appointment, the governor 
shall consider the diversity of the state’s population for an appellate court appoint-
ment and the diversity of the county’s population for a trial court appointment, how-
ever the primary consideration shall be merit.”).  For a more detailed explanation of 
the process, see Ariz. Supreme Court, Merit Selection in Arizona, at http:// 
www.supreme.state.az.us/hr/meritpage.htm (last modified Sept. 25, 2003). 
 Like the superior court judges, the Maricopa County commissioners are also ap-
pointed through a merit selection process. See Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa 
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attending national workshops in either San Diego or Minneapolis,120 
26 federal district judges attending a national workshop in Philadel-
phia, and 71 trial court judges from a large urban trial court.121 
The judges in our sample share important characteristics.  All of 
the judges participating in this study were appointed, and all function 
essentially as trial court judges who manage cases, facilitate settlement, 
hear motions, and preside over trials.  The principal difference among 
the judges is that the federal magistrates conduct trials only in civil 
cases and misdemeanor criminal cases, and focus most of their atten-
tion on pretrial matters, while the federal district judges and the 
judges from Maricopa County and the urban jurisdiction are respon-
sible collectively for a slightly broader range of civil and criminal mat-
ters. 
 
County, Judge Information:  Superior Court Commissioners, at http://www.superiorcourt. 
maricopa.gov/judicialbios/judiciallist.asp?title=2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (“Commis-
sioners are appointed by the Court’s Presiding Judge from attorneys who apply and are 
recommended by a selection committee made up of judges, lawyers and others.”).  The 
commissioners function much like the magistrate judges in the federal district courts, 
performing a subset of the functions of the superior court judges.  See id. (“Commis-
sioners handle specific assigned cases and uncontested matters.”); see also Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
faq.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (“A U.S. magistrate judge . . . exercise[s] jurisdic-
tion over matters assigned by statute as well as those delegated by the district judges.”). 
120 We described federal magistrate judges at some length in our prior article on 
judicial decision making.  See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 784-85 
(describing the function and selection of federal magistrate judges).  Congress created 
the office of the federal magistrate judge in 1968.  Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 
90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2000 & 
Supp. 2001)).  Federal magistrate judges perform a variety of functions, including mak-
ing preliminary rulings in civil and criminal cases and organizing settlement confer-
ences.  These judges can also preside over civil trials with the litigants’ consent.  Be-
tween September 2002 and September 2003, federal magistrate judges handled 
315,455 preliminary criminal proceedings, 82,138 civil pretrial conferences, and en-
tered final judgment in 13,811 cases litigated by civil consent.  MECHAM, supra note 
109, at 38-39 tbl.S-17.  Federal magistrate judges apply for the position and are selected 
by “merit selection panels” charged with “identifying and recommending persons who 
are best qualified to fill such positions.”  28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2001).  
Based on these recommendations, the district judges in the relevant district vote for 
their preferred applicant.  Id. § 631(a).  The magistrates serve renewable eight-year 
terms.  Id. § 631(e). 
121 This group of judges participated in the study only on the condition that we 
not identify the jurisdiction.  We can roughly identify the characteristics of these 
judges, however.  All are from a single jurisdiction.  They are similar to the judges from 
Maricopa County (although they are not from Arizona).  That is, these judges are also 
the principal trial court judges in their jurisdiction, they are appointed through a merit 
selection procedure, they serve for renewable fixed terms, and they rotate through 
multiple departments within their jurisdiction. 
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We did not ask the judges to identify themselves by name, but we 
did ask them to identify their gender and number of years of experi-
ence on the bench.122  Overall, approximately one-third of the judges 
in our sample are women (30.6% in San Diego, 24.0% in Minneapolis, 
21.6% in Maricopa County, 14.8% among the federal district judges, 
and 44.2% in the urban jurisdiction).  The judges also have a great 
deal of judicial experience.  On average, the federal magistrate judges 
attending the San Diego conference had 9.2 years of experience at the 
time of the conference, the magistrate judges in Minneapolis had 14.2 
years of experience, the Maricopa County judges had 7.2 years of ex-
perience, the federal district judges had 11.2 years of experience as 
federal district judges (13.5 years of judicial experience in total, in-
cluding the prior experience of the 6 judges who reported that they 
had served as state judges before their appointment to the federal 
bench), and the urban jurisdiction judges had 9.2 years of experience 
on the bench. 
C.  The Procedure 
We collected the data reported in this study at five different judi-
cial educational conferences:  two for federal magistrate judges, one 
for federal district judges, and one each for the Maricopa County and 
urban jurisdiction judges.  The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) hosted 
the conference for federal district judges in Philadelphia in April 2004 
and the two conferences for federal magistrate judges, one in San Di-
ego in April 2002 and another in Minneapolis in June 2002.123  At 
these three conferences, we presented an optional program on the 
“Psychology of Judging,” which 36 judges in San Diego, 26 judges in 
Minneapolis, and 28 judges in Philadelphia elected to attend. 
We collected data from the Maricopa County judges and the 
judges from the urban jurisdiction at their respective annual continu-
ing education conferences.  At both of these conferences, the three of 
us presented a program on the “Psychology of Judging.”  The great 
majority of the judges in each of these jurisdictions attended these 
conferences.  Further, these two conferences did not include any op-
 
122 Knowing that we would have a mixed group of judges in Maricopa County, we 
asked the judges in this group to identify their title as well.  See supra note 119 (describ-
ing the differing roles and functions of Maricopa County Superior Court judges and 
commissioners). 
123 Some of these judges had participated in our earlier study of magistrate judges.  
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 785. 
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tional sessions, so the judges did not self-select to attend our pro-
grams.  In the case of the urban jurisdiction, all but a few of the judges 
in the jurisdiction attended the conference and participated in our 
study (the educational conference was described as mandatory by the 
chief judge of this jurisdiction).  In the case of Maricopa County, 85% 
of the county’s superior court judges and 68% of the county’s com-
missioners participated.124 
At all of the conferences, we employed similar methods.  We dis-
tributed our questionnaires to the judges in person prior to our pres-
entation.  We asked the judges to read and respond to each of the 
questions and to do so independently.  At all five conferences, the 
judges appeared to take the questionnaires seriously.  The rooms were 
silent during the administration of the questionnaires. 
Because we did not ask the judges to identify themselves, all re-
sponses were anonymous.  We also informed the judges that partici-
pation in the survey was entirely voluntary.125  The final page of the 
questionnaires gave the judges the opportunity to limit the use of 
their answers to discussion during their particular conference, 
thereby excluding them from discussion in other contexts and from 
use in any publication.  One magistrate judge in San Diego, one mag-
istrate judge in Minneapolis, one federal district judge, and two 
judges in the urban jurisdiction exercised this option.  The question-
naires completed by judges who exercised this option are not in-
cluded in our analysis. 
D.  The Materials 
We gave each participating judge a questionnaire that included 
between four and seven scenarios, only some of which dealt with the 
 
124 See Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa County, Superior Court Judges, at 
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/judicialbios/index.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 
2005) (providing links to the number of superior court judgeships and commissioner 
positions in the jurisdiction, from which we calculated the percentage of judges and 
commissioners in attendance). 
125 The title page to the questionnaire consisted of the name of the conference, 
city, and date, followed by the paragraph below: 
 Many of the points discussed by this panel are best understood if experi-
enced directly.  We therefore ask that before the session starts, you read and 
respond to each of the questions enclosed in the survey (although doing so is 
voluntary, of course).  Please do so independently and please do not discuss the 
surveys with others while you are responding to the questions.  We shall collect these 
surveys before the discussion and present the results during the panel session. 
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subject of this Article.126  The judges evaluated scenarios designed to 
assess their ability to disregard the following types of inadmissible evi-
dence:127 
1) settlement demands made during a pretrial conference; 
2) information protected by the attorney-client privilege and re-
viewed in camera by the judge; 
3) inadmissible sexual history in a criminal case involving an al-
leged sexual assault; 
4) a presumptively inadmissible criminal record in a civil case; 
5) information obtained by the prosecution from a criminal de-
fendant which the government had agreed not to use at sentencing 
under a “cooperation agreement”; 
6) the outcome of a search involving a probable cause determina-
tion; and 
7) a criminal confession obtained during an interrogation con-
ducted after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel. 
To assess the judges’ ability to disregard this information, we used 
a “between groups” or “between subjects” experimental design.128  
That is, we created two versions of each scenario, a “control” version 
and one or more “suppression” versions.  In the control version, we 
 
126 The materials used at each of the four sessions varied.  The questionnaires for 
all of the groups of federal magistrate judges included four different hypotheticals for 
the judges to evaluate.  The questionnaires for the federal district judges included five 
scenarios.  The trial judges from the anonymous urban jurisdiction responded to seven 
different scenarios.  Finally, each of the questionnaires administered to the Maricopa 
County judges included four out of five different scenarios (two scenarios were each 
given to one-half of the judges).  We did not vary the order in which the materials were 
presented within any single educational conference. 
127 Both groups of the federal magistrate judges and judges in the urban jurisdic-
tion also received other scenarios not reported here.  The federal magistrates in San 
Diego received two other questions (involving attractiveness and sentencing, and an 
assessment of the admissibility of a coerced confession); the federal magistrate judges 
in Minneapolis received one other question (involving subsequent remedial meas-
ures); and judges in the urban jurisdiction received four other questions (involving 
attractiveness and sentencing, contrast effects in witness credibility, conjunctive effects 
in a criminal case, and presentation format of DNA evidence). 
128 See DAVID W. MARTIN, DOING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 150-53, 172 (6th ed. 
2004) (explaining that a between-subjects experiment can be advantageous because 
“participants are exposed to only one level of the independent variable, so the other 
levels cannot affect the participants’ behavior”); JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY & EUGENE B. 
ZECHMEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 176-85 (3d ed. 1994) (describing 
the elements of a successful experiment, and noting that “[t]he primary reason that 
experiments are so effective for testing hypotheses is that they allow researchers to ex-
ercise a relatively high level of control”). 
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provided a description of the scenario and then asked the judge to 
make a substantive ruling (i.e., civil liability, criminal liability, or 
damages).  In the suppression version, we provided the same descrip-
tion of the scenario, but we added inadmissible information for the 
judge to review before we asked the judge to make the very same sub-
stantive ruling.  We then compared the rulings made by the judges in 
the control version of each scenario to the suppression version(s).  
Because the only thing we varied between the control and suppres-
sion conditions was the presence of the inadmissible information—
that is, because we controlled for all other factors that might influ-
ence the judges’ decision making—we can attribute any differences 
in the rulings between the groups to the presence of that informa-
tion.129  In other words, the inadmissible information is our “inde-
pendent variable”130 and the substantive decision is our “dependent 
variable.”131 
 
129 See SHAUGHNESSY & ZECHMEISTER, supra note 128, at 182 (explaining that in a 
random groups design, “if the groups perform differently, it is presumed that the in-
dependent variable is responsible”). 
130 See id. at 178 (describing independent variables as “[t]he factors that the re-
searcher controls or manipulates”). 
131 See id. (describing dependent variables as “[t]he measures that are used to as-
sess the effect (if any) of the independent variables”). 
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Table 1 identifies the scenarios that each group of judges re-
ceived: 
Table 1:  Distribution of the Seven Scenarios132 
 
Scenario 
 
Group 
Settle-
ment 
A-C 
Privi-
lege 
Sexual 
History 
Prior 
Convic-
tion 
Co-op 
Agree-
ment 
Search 
Out-
come 
Crim. 
Confes-
sion 
Fed. Mag. 
Judges: 
San Diego 
Low All      
Fed. Mag. 
Judges: 
Minneapolis 
High   All  
All, 
Version 
2 
 
Maricopa 
County  
High 
/ Half 
Half 
All, 
Version 
2 
All   All 
Fed. Dist. 
Judges 
    All   
Urban 
Jurisdiction 
Low  
All, 
Version 
1 
  
All, 
Version 
1 
 
 
132 The settlement scenario had two versions, as described below.  All of the judges 
received one of these, except that only half of the Maricopa County judges received 
this item.  The half of the Maricopa County judges that did not receive this scenario 
received the attorney-client privilege scenario instead.  The first version of the sexual 
history problem, run in the urban jurisdiction, did not provide a meaningful test of 
our hypothesis, and hence was changed before being run again in Maricopa County.  
Specifically, the first version produced an extremely low conviction rate:  12.1%, or 4 
out of 33 in the control conviction and 3% (1 out of 33) in the suppression condition.  
Given that the suppressed evidence was intended to facilitate an acquittal, the low con-
viction rates made it impossible to discern any effect of the suppressed evidence.  The 
revisions added evidence intended to facilitate convictions:  the victim reported the 
incident immediately, the victim had suffered observable bruises consistent with forci-
ble intercourse, and the victim suffered emotional consequences from the encounter.  
The prior search problem was also rewritten because of an ambiguity in the question 
that was remedied for the Minneapolis judges.  Copies of all scenarios are described 
below and full versions are included in their original form in the Appendix. 
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III.  THE RESULTS 
A.  Anchoring and Settlement Talks 
Our first scenario explores whether judges who encounter inad-
missible information during a pretrial settlement conference are able 
to disregard it at trial.  Both the Federal Rules of Evidence133 and state 
evidence rules or codes134 prohibit the introduction of “conduct or 
statements made in compromise negotiations” into evidence at trial.135  
The rules exclude this information primarily for extrinsic reasons, 
namely “to foster ‘complete candor’ between parties”136 and thereby 
facilitate settlement.137 
We sought to determine whether judges who encounter inadmis-
sible information during a settlement conference might nonetheless 
be influenced by it when ruling at trial.  In particular, judges might be 
influenced by the offers or demands parties make during settlement 
talks due to a phenomenon called “anchoring.”138 
Anchoring operates in the following way.  When people estimate 
an uncertain numeric value, they commonly rely on any numeric 
 
133 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
134 E.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 408. 
135 In full, Rule 408 of both the Federal Rules and the Arizona Rules of Evidence 
provides as follows: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accept-
ing or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromis-
ing or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either valid-
ity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim 
or its amount.  Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise nego-
tiations is likewise not admissible.  This rule does not require the exclusion of 
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the 
course of compromise negotiations.  This rule also does not require exclusion 
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Id.  The rule governing the urban jurisdiction is similar. 
136 Hernandez v. State, 52 P.3d 765, 768 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (citing 23 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5314, at 
286 (1980)). 
137 See supra note 10 (giving reasons for excluding evidence of settlement offers); 
see also FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (describing the purpose of the rule 
as “freedom of communication with respect to compromise”).  For a statement of the 
policy favoring settlement in our civil justice system, see Stephen McG. Bundy, The Pol-
icy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1992). 
138 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (describing anchoring). 
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value that happens to be available to them.139  The initial value pro-
vides a starting point that “anchors” the estimation process.140  Across 
dozens of studies, psychologists have found that the adjustment from 
the anchor is inadequate, thereby giving the anchor greater influence 
on the estimated numerical value than it should have.141  Even irrele-
vant or ridiculous anchors that bear no relationship to the actual nu-
merical value can influence estimates.142 
Legal scholars have expressed concerns about anchoring in the 
legal system.143  In particular, scholars have worried about the perni-
cious effects that anchors might have on civil damage awards, espe-
cially “pain and suffering” damages and punitive damages.  Indeed, 
several studies have demonstrated that plaintiffs’ requests for dam-
ages—even absurdly high requests144—influence the amounts that 
mock jurors award.145 
Some scholars have argued that the influence of anchors calls for 
an expansion of the judicial role—and concomitant contraction of the 
jury’s role—in the damage assessment process.146  Such claims, of 
course, assume that judges are largely immune from the effects of an-
 
139 See id. at 1128 (showing that providing starting points to subjects influences 
their estimates). 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the 
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic:  Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experi-
menter-Provided Anchors, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391 (2001); Fritz Strack & Thomas Musswei-
ler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:  Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1997). 
142 In one study, for example, people gave higher estimates for the mean daytime 
temperature in downtown San Francisco if they were first asked whether that mean 
temperature was greater than 558° Fahrenheit.  See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 (1993) (summarizing a 1984 study conducted by 
George Quattrone and his colleagues). 
143 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 789-90 (discussing an-
choring in civil damage awards). 
144 See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the 
More You Get:  Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 
525-26 (1996) (finding in a case involving fairly modest damages that mock jurors were 
still influenced by a plaintiff’s lawyer’s request for $1 billion). 
145 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 789-90 (listing several 
such studies). 
146 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1182 (2002) (“A more promising strategy 
for reducing incoherence would be to give relatively greater power to the reviewing 
court and relatively less power to the jury. . . . [J]udges are in a better position to move 
toward global coherence, or at least to avoid the worst anomalies.”). 
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chors.  Our prior research on judges makes us skeptical about this as-
sumption.147 
1.  Anchoring and Settlement Talks:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges might be influenced by anchors supplied 
in settlement conferences, we created a scenario entitled “Assessment 
of Damages.”148  In this scenario, the participating judges149 learn that 
they are presiding in a bench trial involving a suit arising from an 
automobile accident.  The plaintiff is a 31-year-old high school teacher 
who lost his right arm after he was hit by a truck driven by one of the 
defendant’s employees.  Since the accident, the plaintiff has had prob-
lems at work; additionally, he can no longer play recreational softball 
or even play catch with his son.  He also endured a great deal of pain.  
The defendant, a large package-delivery company, admits fault but 
disputes the extent of plaintiff’s damages. 
The materials state that at the request of the parties, the judges 
agreed to preside over a settlement conference on the eve of trial.  At 
the conference, plaintiff’s counsel informed the judges that the plain-
tiff was eager to recover monetary damages from the defendant.  
Judges assigned to the control conditions did not receive a specific 
dollar request from plaintiff’s counsel,150 while judges assigned to the 
two suppression conditions learn that the plaintiff had demanded ei-
 
147 In a prior article, we reported experimental evidence that judges, like mock 
jurors, are susceptible to the effects of an irrelevant anchor.  Guthrie, Rachlinski & 
Wistrich, supra note 108, at 790-92. 
148 Infra Appendix, pp. 1332-33. 
149 We gave all of the judges except the federal district judges either the low- or the 
high-anchor materials and their appropriately matched control conditions.  The fed-
eral magistrate judges in San Diego reviewed the low-anchor materials while the fed-
eral magistrate judges in Minneapolis reviewed the high-anchor materials.  The urban 
jurisdiction judges reviewed the low-anchor materials and half of the Maricopa County 
judges reviewed the high-anchor materials.  Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
150 The two control conditions varied slightly from one another.  In the control 
condition matched with the low-anchor condition, the materials explained to the judge 
that, “[d]uring the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney confided in you that 
his client could use the money and wanted to eliminate any possibility of an appeal.”  
In the control condition matched with the high-anchor condition, the materials ex-
plained that, “[d]uring the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney confided in 
you that his client was intent upon collecting a significant monetary payment.”  Note 
that the relevant comparisons for our purposes are between the judges in the first con-
trol group vis-à-vis the low-anchor judges and between the judges in the second control 
group vis-à-vis the high-anchor judges.  We do not compare the control groups to one 
another. 
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ther $175,000 (low-anchor version) or $10,000,000 (high-anchor ver-
sion) to settle the case. 
The materials state that the settlement conference was unsuccess-
ful, and so the case proceeded to trial.  The materials reminded the 
judges that “[t]he settlement discussions are, of course, not admissible 
evidence at trial under Rule ___ of the ___ Rules of Evidence.”151  
Nonetheless, the settlement demands disclosed in settlement might 
impermissibly anchor the judges’ determinations of pain and suffering 
damages. 
2.  Anchoring and Settlement Talks:  Results 
Tables 2 and 3, below, present the results for this scenario.  Both 
the low anchor ($175,000) and the high anchor ($10,000,000) had a 
significant impact on the pain and suffering damages awarded by the 
judges.  As each table demonstrates, the results were not the product 
of a few extremely low or extremely high awards in the suppression 
conditions; rather, the anchors shifted the whole distribution of 
awards downwards (in the case of the low anchor) or upwards (in the 
case of the high anchor). 
The judges assigned to the low-anchor condition gave the plaintiff 
a mean award of $612,000, while the judges assigned to the matched 
control condition awarded nearly $1,400,000 on average.  Thus, the 
judges in the low-anchor condition gave the plaintiff a mean award 
less than half the size of the mean award given by the judges in the 
control condition.  The difference between these two groups was sig-
nificant,152 using both a parametric and a more appropriate nonpara-
metric test.153 
 
151 Infra Appendix, p. 1332.  The materials supplied the citation to the rule num-
ber for the relevant jurisdiction. 
152 Throughout this paper, the term “significance” denotes only a statistical rela-
tionship. 
153 Two-sample t(52) = 2.78, p < .01; Mann-Whitney U = 2270, p < .005.  Through-
out this paper, all t -tests were performed without assuming equal variances in the two 
samples.  The data are skewed positively, making the nonparametric test more reliable. 
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Table 2:  Low-Anchor Study:  Means and Quartile Results 
(in $1000s) 
Condition (and n) Mean 1st Quartile Median 3d Quartile 
Low Anchor (53) 612 250 500 750 
Control-Low Anchor (47) 1396 366 600 1500 
 
The judges assigned to the high-anchor condition awarded over 
$2,200,000 on average, while judges assigned to the matched control 
condition awarded $808,000 on average.  Thus, the judges in the high-
anchor condition gave the plaintiff a mean award almost three times 
the size of the award given by the judges in the control condition.  
The difference between these two groups is also significant, using both 
parametric and non-parametric tests.154 
Table 3:  High-Anchor Study:  Means and Quartile Results 
(in $1000s) 
Condition (and n) Mean 1st Quartile Median 3d Quartile 
Control-High Anchor (37) 808 325 700 1000 
High Anchor (38) 2210 575 1000 3000 
 
We also attempted to assess the effects of gender, court (i.e., court 
on which the judge sits), and experience on the awards.  To do so, we 
transformed the raw data to create a normal distribution and then 
performed our analyses on the log-transformed data.  For both the 
low-anchor and high-anchor studies, we regressed the award on condi-
tion, gender, court, and an interaction term of condition with gender, 
type, and experience.  We found no significant main effects or interac-
tions for gender or for court in either the low- or high-anchor scenar-
ios.  In the high-anchor condition, we observed a trend for female 
judges to be less affected by the anchor, although this trend was not 
significant.155  We also found that, among judges in the two conditions 
 
154 Two-sample t(44) = 3.44, p < .005; Mann-Whitney U = 1086.5, p < .001. 
155 The t -ratio of the coefficient for the interaction was 1.56, p = .12.  Among 
judges in the low-anchor condition, the correlation between experience and the log of 
the award was .024, whereas among judges in the corresponding control condition, the 
correlation was -.237.  This difference produced the trend towards an interaction.  Be-
cause the correlation between experience and awards was negative in the control condi-
tion, we cannot conclude that experience in any way mitigated the effect of the low an-
chor.  Such an effect would have produced the opposite tendency (a positive 
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testing for the effect of low anchors, more experienced judges tended 
to award less.156  This effect did not interact significantly with condi-
tion.157  We did not observe any effect of experience on awards in the 
two conditions testing for the effects of high anchors. 
A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 suggests an unexpected trend for 
the judges in the “no anchor” conditions in each study to have pro-
vided different results.  Even though the scenarios were identical, 
judges in the “no anchor” condition in the low-anchor study provided 
a mean award of $1.396 million, whereas judges in the “no anchor” 
condition in the high-anchor study provided a mean award of 
$808,000.  This apparent difference was not reliable, however.158 
3.  Anchoring and Settlement Talks:  Discussion 
The anchors appear to have influenced the judges’ assessments of 
the appropriate amount of damages to award.  Relative to the judges 
assigned to the control conditions, the high-anchor judges gave sub-
stantially higher awards and the low-anchor judges gave substantially 
lower awards. 
The anchors provided in this study—in contrast to the anchors 
that psychologists typically provide in their studies of anchoring—are 
at least arguably relevant to the judges’ assessment of damages.  The 
plaintiff’s lawyer disclosed valuable information to the judges about 
his client’s sense of entitlement.159  Counsel may have made this dis-
closure for strategic reasons, of course, but the disclosure was pre-
sumably grounded in some perceived reality and hence is correlated 
with the harm his client believes he has suffered.  Despite the anchor’s 
conceivable relevance, however, the applicable evidentiary rules re-
 
correlation between experience and awards in the low-anchor condition such that the 
awards among more experienced judges would have been similar in both conditions). 
156 The t -ratio of the coefficient for experience was 2.04, p < .05. 
157 The t -ratio of the coefficient for the interaction was 1.56, p = .12. 
158 Two-sample t(63) = 1.97, p = .05; Mann-Whitney U = 2124.0, p = .25.  An analysis 
performed on the log transformation of the damage award also revealed no significant 
difference between the two samples.  Two-sample t(66) = 1.64, p = .11.  Note that one 
judge had awarded $0; this amount was adjusted to $1 before the log transformation of 
the data so as to preserve this observation in the analysis. 
159 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (“The evidence is irrele-
vant, since the offer [to compromise] may be motivated by a desire for peace rather 
than from any concession of weakness of position.”). 
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quire the judges to disregard it.  The materials explicitly reminded the 
judges of this rule.160 
Nonetheless, the inadmissible information disclosed in the settle-
ment talks appears to have influenced the judges exposed to it.  Sur-
reptitious reliance (even if it was unintentional) on information elic-
ited during the settlement conference undermines the goals of Rule 
408 and other rules like it.  These prohibitions are designed to en-
courage parties to be open and candid; but to the extent the parties 
fear that their discussions will be used against them later, they are 
more likely to behave strategically in settlement talks and reach a bar-
gaining impasse. 
This study obviously has its limits.  Anchoring may be a uniquely 
powerful phenomenon; if so, other disclosures made during settle-
ment conferences might have a lesser impact on judges.  Moreover, 
judges in actual cases would have much more information about the 
parties and their dispute, so even if anchors are powerful, the effects 
of anchors might be muted.  Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe 
that the results of this study are generalizable to the real world.  The 
damages demanded by a plaintiff are uniquely salient, so even under 
circumstances where judges learn substantially more information 
about the parties or are supplied with alternative anchors, judges are 
likely to have difficulty disregarding this particular information.161  
Moreover, judges, like other decision makers, are most likely to rely 
on cognitive shortcuts, such as anchoring, when they face time con-
straints that force them to process complex information quickly.  Al-
though judges certainly face time pressure in the courtroom, judges 
also can delay their decisions in some circumstances so as to allow 
themselves more time to think.  As with all of our results, the data sug-
gest potential obstacles to good decision making, more so than provid-
ing definitive evidence of poor decision making. 
These results impart some lessons for litigants engaged in settle-
ment talks in front of a judge.  Despite the protection of evidentiary 
restrictions, settlement discussions might affect how a judge thinks 
about a case.  This suggests that parties should be cautious about their 
discussions, or that they should be strategic.  A judge can facilitate the 
 
160 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
161 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 792-94 (discussing the 
power of anchors in judicial decision making). 
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candor that might be essential to settlement only by declining to sit as 
the presiding judge should the case fail to settle. 
These results underscore the importance of judicial recusal and 
disqualification in maintaining the integrity of the legal system.  
Judges who learn important facts, from the settlement process or from 
pretrial rulings, should consider the potential influence of this infor-
mation, especially in a bench trial or while ruling on dispositive mo-
tions.  Although our work shows that judges sometimes display a re-
markable ability to ignore inadmissible evidence, judges might not be 
able to discern which evidence they can reliably ignore.162  By and 
large, the rules governing recusal and disqualification are generous in 
facilitating judicial removal when even the appearance of impropriety 
exists.163 
Pockets of law are not so solicitous of this concern, however.  No-
tably, Justices on the United States Supreme Court commonly argue 
that they have a “duty to sit” on a case that overrides ordinary con-
cerns of impropriety or bias.164  Similarly, decision makers in adminis-
trative agencies similarly cannot be disqualified from decisions absent 
a showing by clear and convincing evidence that they have an “unal-
terably closed mind.”165  Our results suggest either that the law needs 
to be more vigorous in prescribing disqualification in these areas, or 
that judges should be receptive to recusing themselves, and perhaps 
even recuse themselves when they do not sense the influence of ex-
traneous evidence. 
 
 162 See Kovacs v. Szentes, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (Conn. 1943) (“A judge has not such 
control over his mental faculties that he can definitely determine whether or not in-
admissible evidence he has heard will affect his mind in making his decision.”). 
 163 See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 237, 238 (1987) (“Courts declare that impartiality is so important that a reason-
able—albeit incorrect—appearance of bias compels recusal . . . .”); see also Debra Lyn 
Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manu-
script at 2, on file with authors) (“Avoiding the appearance of impropriety requires a 
judge to withdraw from a case when the judge’s impartiality in a matter might reasona-
bly be questioned.”). 
 164 See Bassett, supra note 163 (manuscript at 19-21) (reviewing the “duty to sit” in 
the United States Supreme Court). 
 165 C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n individual 
should be disqualified from rulemaking only when there has been a clear and convinc-
ing showing that the Department member has an unalterably closed mind on matters 
critical to the disposition of the proceeding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  
1294 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1251 
 
B.  Attorney-Client Privilege 
Our second scenario explores the question of whether judges can 
ignore highly relevant information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.166  The attorney-client privilege is premised on the assump-
tion that clients will disclose critical information to their attorneys 
only if they know that such disclosures will not come back to haunt 
them.167  Because obtaining proper legal advice requires that clients be 
able to relate this information to their attorneys, the privilege is cen-
tral to the administration of justice.168 
Nonetheless, we anticipated that the judges might have trouble 
disregarding privileged information relevant to the merits of the case.  
In particular, privileged information revealing that a client knows that 
she is guilty or that she should lose a civil case might be especially dif-
ficult to disregard.  Such information not only reveals the weaknesses 
in the litigant’s case, but also undermines her credibility and suggests 
that she might be abusing the justice system.  It might be difficult to 
disregard such information. 
1.  Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges are able to ignore disclosures protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, we created and administered a sce-
nario entitled “Evaluation of a Contract Dispute.”169  In this scenario, 
the participating judges170 learn that they are presiding over a bench 
trial involving a contract dispute between a freelance consultant 
named Jones and a movie studio called SmithFilms. 
The judges learn that the outcome of the dispute will turn on 
whether they find that the studio offered Jones “producer credit” 
 
166 Rule 501 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence and Arizona Statute section 12-2234 
protect attorney-client communications.  See ARIZ. R. EVID. 501 (regarding privileges 
generally); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (West 2003) (privileging communications 
between lawyer and client in civil cases). 
167 See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege 
“is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid 
of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can 
only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the appre-
hension of disclosure”). 
168 Id. 
169 Infra Appendix, pp. 1334-35. 
170 We gave this scenario to all of the federal magistrate judges attending the San 
Diego conference and half of the judges attending the Maricopa County conference.  
Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
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when it retained him to work on a movie.  The only writing in the case 
consists of a short letter, signed both by Jones and the studio’s owner 
(Smith), stating that “Jones will provide various services to SmithFilms, 
that Jones will continue to be paid a monthly salary as an independent 
contractor until the film is released, and that Jones will receive such 
other consideration as was agreed upon by the parties during the pre-
signing breakfast.”171  Jones contends that Smith offered him producer 
credit as part of the package, and he presents testimony from a wait-
ress who stated that she thought she overheard the parties discussing 
producer credit at their breakfast meeting.  Unfortunately, Smith has 
fallen ill and is in a coma, so the movie studio’s only viable defense is 
to argue that Smith generally did not offer such credit. 
In addition to learning this information, the judges assigned to 
the suppression group were told that before they decided the merits, 
they must resolve a discovery dispute.  The materials state that the de-
fendant filed a motion to compel production of an audiotaped con-
versation between Jones and his business attorney (not the attorney 
representing him in this litigation).172  The plaintiff argues that the 
conversation is protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the de-
fendant contends that Jones was seeking business advice, not legal ad-
vice, from this attorney.173 
The materials state that the “parties requested that you listen to 
the audiotape in camera,”174 including the following excerpt from the 
conversation: 
Jones:  I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for producer 
credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it.  But I 
meant to.  I need your legal opinion, Greg.  Suppose that I send Smith a 
letter now saying that I meant for producer credit to be part of the deal.  
Would that be legally binding? 
Gonzalez:  No.  If you and Smith did not agree on producer credit dur-
ing breakfast, you don’t have a leg to stand on.  A letter now won’t help. 
Jones:  Darn.  That’s a shame.
175
 
 
171 Infra Appendix, p. 1334. 
172 Infra Appendix, p. 1334. 
173 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (West 2003) (stating that the attorney-
client privilege is applicable only where the communication involves either the “provid-
ing [of] legal advice” or “obtaining information in order to” do so). 
174 Infra Appendix, p. 1334. 
 175 Infra Appendix, p. 1334. 
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The judges learn that “[t]he rest of the audiotape confirms that Gon-
zalez was functioning solely in a legal capacity.”176  The judges are then 
asked to “rule on a motion to compel production of the audiotape.”177 
Thereafter, the materials return to the same script as in the con-
trol condition.  Ultimately, the judges in both conditions are asked to 
indicate whether they would rule for Jones (the plaintiff) or Smith-
Films (the defendant) in this contract dispute. 
2.  Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Results 
The information protected by the attorney-client privilege had an 
impact on the judges’ resolution of the merits.  In the control condi-
tion, 55.6% (25 out of 45) of the judges found for the plaintiff.  The 
judges in the suppression condition were less hospitable to the plain-
tiff’s claim.  Among those who ruled that the audiotape was privileged, 
only 29.2% (7 out of 24) found for the plaintiff.  The difference be-
tween the responses of the judges in these two groups was statistically 
significant.178 
A substantial percentage of the judges (33.3%, or 12 out of 36) 
granted the motion to compel production of the audiotape.  Among 
these judges, 25% (3 out of 12) found for the plaintiff.  This percent-
age did not differ significantly from the percentage of judges who had 
suppressed the audiotape (29.2%).179 
We also conducted additional analyses of demographic variables.  
Using logistic regression on the verdict, we found no significant main 
effects of gender or experience, or of the interaction of these two 
variables with condition.  We did, however, uncover a main effect for 
court.  In Maricopa County, 31.6% of the judges (12 out of 38) found 
for the plaintiff, whereas 64.5% (20 out of 31) of the federal magis-
trate judges found for the plaintiff.180  This effect did not interact with 
condition. 
 
176 Infra Appendix, p. 1335. 
177 Infra Appendix, p. 1335. 
178 Fisher’s exact p < .05. 
179 Fisher’s exact p > .5. 
180 The t -ratio of the coefficient for court was 2.20, p < .05. 
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3.  Attorney-Client Privilege:  Discussion 
Exposure to the privileged information appears to have influ-
enced the judges’ decisions.  Although a majority of the judges who 
had not seen the privileged materials ruled in favor of the plaintiff, 
fewer than 30% of the judges who determined the materials were 
privileged ruled the same way.  Even though the judges themselves 
ruled that the information was privileged, and therefore immune 
from discovery, this information appears to have had a substantial im-
pact on their assessments of civil liability. 
The results of this study comport with the intuitions of at least 
some of the judges in our study who wrote on the questionnaire that 
they would recuse themselves in this situation.  One judge even added 
a line next to our available answers, wrote “recuse self” with an open 
box next to it, and then checked the box!  Although admittedly anec-
dotal, these responses suggest that at least some of the judges recog-
nized that they would have a difficult time ignoring the privileged in-
formation at trial. 
It is worth noting that a third of the judges in the suppression 
condition granted the motion to compel production, even though the 
conversation is probably best construed as privileged.  One could ar-
gue that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege ap-
plies.181  That is, if the plaintiff had hired his business attorney for the 
purpose of perpetrating a fraud, then his conversation would not be 
privileged.  But the context of the conversation suggests that the 
plaintiff consulted his business attorney for purposes of obtaining le-
gal advice, not for purposes of committing a fraud. 
At the same time, it is likely that the plaintiff’s litigation attorney 
would have reviewed the audiotape.  Hence, the plaintiff’s attorney is 
arguably pursuing a lawsuit that she knows lacks merit.  This might 
give rise to an ethics violation if the plaintiff’s attorney does not at-
tempt to withdraw.182  Neither the rules against frivolous litigation nor 
the ethics rules, however, create an exception to the attorney-client 
privilege in this circumstance.183  Once the judge determines that the 
 
181 See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (discussing the crime-
fraud exception to attorney-client privilege). 
182 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (“A lawyer shall not bring 
or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so . . . .”). 
183 See id. R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the represen-
tation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”).  But cf. id. R. 3.3(b) 
(“A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a 
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conversation is protected by the privilege, the in camera review ends, 
and the judge can make no further use of the materials.  Furthermore, 
the fact that one-quarter of the twelve judges who ordered the produc-
tion of the audiotape also ruled in favor of the plaintiff suggests that 
the tape is not dispositive and the suit is not wholly frivolous. 
Even though the results of this scenario suggest that the judges’ 
ability to ignore materials they deem privileged will be limited, this 
scenario has limitations of its own.  For instance, judges in actual cases 
might be better able to disregard this information because they would 
have learned many more details about the case.  Judges in our study 
who were exposed to the inadmissible evidence about the plaintiff 
might have inferred that the rest of the plaintiff’s case was also quite 
weak.  On the other hand, the privileged information in our materials 
constitutes the single best piece of evidence available in the case—that 
is, an admission by plaintiff that he has no case.  Extra detail in a real 
case would be unlikely to undermine the importance of this admis-
sion. 
Judges might also perform better in actual cases than they did in 
our study because their motivation to limit their decision to the record 
would be greater in a real case than in a hypothetical one.  Increased 
motivation might cut both ways, however.  On the one hand, a judge 
has more incentive in the real world to follow the evidence rules and 
ignore inadmissible information; on the other hand, a judge also has 
more incentive in the real world to thwart the kind of frivolous claim 
the plaintiff is advancing and to reach a just outcome on the merits. 
C.  Rape-Shield Case 
Our third scenario explores whether judges can disregard the 
sexual history of the alleged victim of a sexual assault.  The admissibil-
ity of a victim’s sexual history in sexual assault cases has been the sub-
ject of debate and legal reform for some time.184  The prospect of 
cross-examination by a hostile attorney delving into one’s sexual past 
can deter the victim of a sexual assault from pursuing a case against a 
 
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent con-
duct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”). 
184 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:  Sexual 
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 81-86 (2002) (discussing 
different categories of rape-shield laws). 
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perpetrator.185  Furthermore, a victim’s sexual history frequently is of 
questionable relevance.  Arguably, any effect such testimony has arises 
merely from stereotypes. 
On the other hand, one cannot entirely rule out the relevance of 
sexual history in a case involving a dispute over consent.  To some, a 
history of sexual promiscuity suggests that a sexual encounter is more 
likely to be consensual.  One could argue exactly the opposite, how-
ever.  After lodging a complaint in a sexual assault case, a sexually ex-
perienced woman might be more credible, having had a history of 
sexual encounters in which she did not make such allegations.  The 
former view appears to be more common.186 
In the face of these concerns, many jurisdictions have adopted so-
called “rape-shield” statutes to limit the admissibility of sexual history 
evidence.187  The relevant rape-shield provision in this instance—
Arizona’s188—differs somewhat from the norm.  Arizona’s statute spe-
cifically prohibits the introduction of evidence of an alleged victim’s 
chastity, rather than evidence of her sexual history.  Arizona’s statute 
takes this curious approach because the state has long barred evidence 
of a victim’s sexual history through the common law.189  Arizona 
adopted its statute in light of this history, and it is intended to extend 
the rape-shield prohibition from sexual history evidence often prof-
fered by a defendant to demonstrate consent to chastity evidence 
sometimes proffered by a prosecutor to demonstrate lack of consent.  
Courts now construe the statute to prohibit both kinds of evidence.190 
 
185 See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (“The rule aims to safeguard 
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual 
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details . . . .”). 
186 See Anderson, supra note 184, at 104 (“A pattern of consensual sexual behavior 
might reveal that the woman has had a considerable amount of sex but has never 
falsely accused someone of rape.”).  See generally Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Be-
lieved?  Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1013 (1991). 
187 See Anderson, supra note 184, at 81-85 (reviewing in brief the history of rape-
shield laws). 
188 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1421 (West 2003). 
189 See, e.g., State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950 (Ariz. 1976) (en 
banc) (“The law does not and should not recognize any necessary connection between 
a witness’ veracity and her sexual immorality.” (citing, inter alia, Sage v. State, 195 P. 
533 (Ariz. 1921))). 
190 See State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069, 1074 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (observing 
that Arizona’s rape-shield statute codified the common law prohibition against the in-
troduction of sexual history evidence, except in rare circumstances). 
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Prior studies of mock jurors suggest that they have difficulty disre-
garding inadmissible information about the sexual history of an al-
leged sexual assault victim.191  Generally, mock jurors are less likely to 
convict the defendant and are more likely to attribute greater respon-
sibility for the events to the victim.192  Despite significant differences 
between a typical mock juror and a typical judge, judges, like mock ju-
rors, might be hard pressed to ignore this evidence, even if they deem 
it inadmissible at trial. 
1.  Rape-Shield Case:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges might be influenced by inadmissible 
sexual history evidence, we created and administered a scenario enti-
tled “Evaluation of a Criminal Case.”193  In this scenario, the participat-
ing judges194 learn that they are presiding in a bench trial involving a 
sexual assault allegedly committed by Mr. Geiger against Ms. Smith. 
Both the complainant and defendant are students at a local uni-
versity who were attending a fraternity party on the night in question.  
The complainant, who had recently become engaged, began drinking 
heavily at the party and was seen talking with the defendant, whom 
she had not previously met.  At some point, the defendant “seemed to 
help [her] ‘walk’ or ‘stagger’ into [his] room” at the fraternity 
house.195  The complainant’s fiancé began looking for her, eventually 
found her in the defendant’s room, and “discovered [the defendant] 
on top of [her]; her skirt was pulled up over her waist.”196  The fiancé 
“pulled Mr. Geiger off of Ms. Smith, threw him onto the floor, and 
then stormed off.  Ms. Smith got up and ran after him.”197 
 
191 See Lenehan & O’Neill, supra note 94, at 238 (“[E]arlier evidence against the 
victim . . . produced significantly higher probability of [a guilty verdict] than where all 
factors were against the defendant . . . .”); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Com-
plainant Sexual History Evidence:  Its Impact on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN 
Q. 252, 259 (2002) (“[T]he proposed safeguard of providing jurors with limiting in-
structions may be ineffective in curbing the pernicious impact of prior [sexual] history 
evidence.”). 
192 See, e.g., Schuller & Hastings, supra note 191, at 259 (“[P]articipants who heard 
that a rape complainant had had a prior sexual relationship with the man accused of 
her rape, were more negative in their evaluations of the woman . . . .”). 
193 Infra Appendix, pp. 1336-37. 
194 We gave Version 1 of this scenario to all of the judges in the urban jurisdiction 
and Version 2 to all of the judges in Maricopa County.  Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
195 Infra Appendix, p. 1336. 
196 Infra Appendix, p. 1336. 
197 Infra Appendix, p. 1336. 
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Ms. Smith reported the alleged assault to the police two hours 
later.  She asserted that she had refused to have sex with the defen-
dant and had shouted “no” a couple of times, but that he had forced 
himself on her.  The police officer who interviewed her reported that 
she was visibly upset while telling the story; moreover, “[a] physical 
examination revealed bruises on her upper thighs.”198  Her fiancé ini-
tially thought the encounter was consensual, but he subsequently 
changed his mind.  Before the incident, the complainant had been 
cheerful and extroverted, but since the incident occurred, she had be-
come moody and depressed.  The defendant testified on his own be-
half, asserting that the encounter had been consensual.  He con-
tended that although he had previously had casual sex with other 
women at parties, he had never engaged in nonconsensual sex with 
anyone. 
In addition to learning this information, the judges assigned to 
the suppression condition learn that the defendant wants to present 
evidence of the victim’s sexual history: 
In his defense, Mr. Geiger is trying to introduce testimony from five 
other students, 3 male and 2 female, that Ms. Smith had a well-deserved 
reputation for being sexually promiscuous.  This includes one of Ms. 
Smith’s best friends who will testify that before Ms. Smith met her fiancé, 
she “had trouble remembering what fraternity house she woke up in 
each Sunday morning.”  Another witness, a former roommate of Ms. 
Smith will assert that Ms. Smith “liked to loosen her inhibitions with a 
few beers too many and then have rough sex with the first guy she 
saw.”
199
 
The judges also learn that “the prosecution has moved to exclude 
such evidence on the ground that it violates Arizona’s ‘Rape Shield’ 
statute . . . which forbids the introduction of evidence concerning a 
victim’s ‘chastity’ or ‘reputation for chastity’ in cases involving sexual 
assault.”200  The materials then ask the judges in the suppression con-
dition how they would rule on this motion to suppress the evidence.  
Finally, the judges assigned to both the control group and the sup-
pression group are asked to indicate whether they would find the de-
fendant guilty of sexual assault.201 
 
198 Infra Appendix, p. 1336. 
199 Infra Appendix, p. 1337. 
200 Infra Appendix, p. 1337. 
201 We tested this phenomenon in the urban jurisdiction using similar materials.  
The results from this jurisdiction, however, were inconclusive.  In the prior version, the 
materials identify a longer delay in the victim’s reporting of the assault and do not in-
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2.  Rape-Shield Case:  The Results 
The judges struggled with this case.  In the control condition, 
49.1% (27 out of 55) of the judges found the defendant guilty.  The 
judges in the suppression condition were much more likely to find the 
defendant not guilty.  Among the judges in the suppression group 
who ruled that the sexual history evidence should be excluded, a mere 
20% (7 out of 35) convicted the defendant.  The difference between 
these two groups was statistically significant.202 
Some of the judges (27.1%, or 13 out of 48) decided to admit the 
evidence.  Among these judges, 7.7% (1 out of 13) convicted the de-
fendant.  The percentage of guilty verdicts in this group did not differ 
significantly from that among the judges who suppressed the evidence 
(20.0%).203 
Further analysis, using logistic regression on the verdict with gen-
der, experience, and the interaction of these two variables with condi-
tion as independent variables, revealed no significant main effects of 
experience or the interaction of experience with condition.  The gen-
der of the judges produced an effect that was marginally significant.204  
Specifically, across the two conditions, female judges were more likely 
to convict (48.2%, or 13 out of 27) than male judges (31.7%, or 19 out 
of 60).  This effect did not interact significantly with condition.  The 
conviction rates among both male and female judges who had sup-
pressed the past sexual history were identical (20.0%), although the 
conviction rate among female judges in the control condition was 
higher than among male judges (64.7%, 11 out of 17, versus 40%, 14 
out of 35). 
 
clude references to bruising.  The victim is also not described as engaging in drinking 
and voluntarily went with the defendant to his room.  These materials produced a low 
conviction rate in the control condition.  Thus, the sexual history had no further 
power to reduce the conviction rate.  In the earlier version, however, we also asked 
judges to report their confidence in the appropriateness of the verdict on a seven-point 
scale.  Although we observed no differences in the conviction rates, we did obtain a 
significant difference in the confidence ratings.  That is, judges expressed more confi-
dence in their acquittals after viewing the sexual history evidence than judges in the 
control condition.  To determine whether the conviction rate would be affected by the 
inadmissible testimony, we altered the evidence to increase the conviction rate in the 
control condition and presented the materials to another group of judges. 
202 Fisher’s exact p = .01. 
203 Fisher’s exact p = .42. 
204 The Z-score of the coefficient for gender was 1.64, p = 10.  Throughout this pa-
per, we refer to any statistical test that produced a significance level between .05 and 
.10 as “marginally significant.” 
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3.  Rape-Shield Case:  Discussion 
Exposure to the victim’s sexual history appears to have influenced 
the judges’ decisions.  The conviction rate dropped by nearly 30% 
among judges who had excluded the evidence compared to judges 
who were not exposed to the evidence.  Even though the judges ruled 
the evidence inadmissible, it still influenced their assessments of the 
defendant’s guilt. 
Although most of the judges decided that the evidence of the vic-
tim’s sexual history was inadmissible, some decided to admit it.  One 
judge later remarked that he admitted the testimony precisely because 
it seemed so relevant, so perhaps the judges who admitted the testi-
mony differed from the judges who excluded it in that they believed 
the testimony was more probative than their colleagues who sustained 
the objection.  Regardless, there is no statistically significant differ-
ence between the verdicts rendered by the judges who admitted the 
evidence and the judges who excluded it (although the numbers are 
small).  Once exposed to the evidence, they were affected by it—
regardless of their view of admissibility. 
These materials present one important difference from most cases 
of sexual assault that might limit the generality of the findings.  The 
sexual history evidence matched the circumstances of the sexual en-
counter closely.  The victim’s history is not merely one of sexual ex-
perience, but one of intoxication, and casual, “rough” sex of precisely 
the type that would explain how this encounter might have been con-
sensual.  It is possible that the judges might have reacted differently to 
our scenario if the victim’s sexual history had been more mundane 
and less similar to the alleged crime at issue in the case. 
Nonetheless, the results suggest that ignoring a victim’s sexual his-
tory can be challenging, especially if the decision maker believes it to 
be relevant to the issue of consent.  The rape-shield statutes thus 
might serve the purpose of keeping a victim’s private life private, but 
the evidence they ostensibly protect might still influence those fact 
finders who learn of it before or during trial.205 
 
205 See Anderson, supra note 184, at 94-137 (providing an extensive review of ex-
ceptions to rape-shield laws that allow admissibility of a rape victim’s sexual history). 
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D.  Prior Criminal Conviction 
Our fourth scenario explores whether judges can disregard a prior 
criminal conviction that is presumptively inadmissible under the rules 
of evidence.  Rule 609 of both the Federal Rules and the Arizona 
Rules of Evidence imposes various limits on the admissibility of prior 
criminal convictions.206  Where more than ten years have elapsed since 
the completion of a sentence resulting from a conviction, the evi-
dence of the conviction is inadmissible unless “the probative value of 
the conviction [is] supported by specific facts and circumstances 
[and] substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”207  This “time 
limit” rule is an intrinsic exclusionary rule that limits the admissibility 
of the prior criminal conviction on the grounds that it might preju-
dice the fact finder.208 
As with many of the rules that limit admissibility on the grounds 
that evidence is prejudicial, the rules governing prior criminal convic-
tions rest on an empirical assumption about the effect of admitting 
such evidence.  Rule 609 assumes that a witness’s criminal past will 
lead juries to make inappropriate decisions motivated by animus to-
ward an individual who has committed mistakes in the distant past.209  
 
206 FED. R. EVID. 609; ARIZ. R. EVID. 609. 
207 Rule 609(b) of both the Federal and Arizona Rules provides as follows: 
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is 
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the 
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circum-
stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.  However, evidence of a 
conviction more than [ten] years old as calculated herein, is not admissible 
unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written no-
tice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair op-
portunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609(b). 
208 See supra text accompanying note 7.  Other portions of Rule 609—for example, 
Rule 609(d), which limits the admissibility of juvenile convictions—are perhaps more 
appropriately classified as extrinsic exclusionary rules.  See supra text accompanying 
note 9. 
209 Indeed, this assumption finds empirical support from mock jury studies.  See, 
e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 94, at 94-96 (finding that evidence of prior con-
victions significantly increased the likelihood that jurors would find a defendant guilty, 
despite a judge’s limiting instructions); Greene & Dodge, supra note 94, at 76 (finding 
that jurors who learn of a defendant’s prior conviction are more likely to convict him 
of a subsequent offense); Hans & Doob, supra note 101, at 251 (finding that the pres-
entation of a defendant’s criminal record to a jury significantly increases the likelihood 
of a guilty verdict); London & Nunez, supra note 95, at 937 (finding that predelibera-
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Perhaps judges, who have experience weighing evidence, might be 
better able than jurors to disregard such potentially prejudicial infor-
mation. 
1.  Prior Criminal Conviction:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges might be influenced by evidence of a 
prior criminal conviction, we created and administered a scenario en-
titled “Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages.”210  In this scenario, 
the participating judges211 are told that they are presiding in a bench 
trial in which the only issue is the appropriate damage award for pain 
and suffering. 
The judges learn that the case involves a products liability suit 
filed by an individual plaintiff against a lawnmower manufacturer (for 
the judges in Arizona) or a snowblower manufacturer (for the judges 
in Minnesota).  The plaintiff is a single, 35-year-old automobile me-
chanic who was badly injured while operating the piece of machinery.  
Although it was equipped with a kill-switch that should have prevented 
the injury, a manufacturing defect caused the switch to fail, resulting 
in a serious injury to the plaintiff’s nondominant arm.  The defendant 
concedes liability and pecuniary damages but disputes the appropriate 
amount of pain and suffering damages. 
With respect to those damages, the plaintiff presents testimony 
from doctors concerning the extent of his injury and pain.  The doc-
tors indicate that his injured arm does not need to be amputated, but 
is likely to remain useless.  The plaintiff also testifies on his own be-
half, describing “continuing pain in his arm, the loss of his job, the 
frustration of adapting to life with just one usable arm, and the nature 
and extent of his pain and resulting total disability.”212  The plaintiff 
 
tion jurors tend to be biased by the presentation of inadmissible evidence); Reinard & 
Reynolds, supra note 93, at 105 (finding that “jurors do not . . . consistently disregard 
sensational inadmissible testimony,” even when instructed by a judge to do so); Tan-
ford & Cox, supra note 94, at 177 (finding that “impeachment evidence leads to 
harsher judgements of a civil defendant” for both credibility and liability); Tanford & 
Cox, supra note 93, at 494 (finding that juries told of a witness’s prior conviction per-
ceived the witness as less credible and inferred greater propensity for future harm and 
negligence). 
210 Infra Appendix, pp. 1338-39. 
211 We gave this scenario to all of the federal magistrate judges attending the con-
ference in Minneapolis and all of the Arizona trial court judges attending the confer-
ence in Maricopa County.  Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
212 Infra Appendix, p. 1338. 
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further testifies that “he had to take prescription narcotic pain medi-
cation continuously.”213  For its part, the defendant offers testimony 
suggesting that the plaintiff is exaggerating his injury.  The defendant 
also presents testimony from an occupational therapist, who states that 
people with such injuries “usually can control their pain and lead rela-
tively normal lives.”214 
The judges assigned to the suppression group215 received an extra 
paragraph after the defendant’s testimony.  The judges in this group 
learn that the defendant seeks to introduce evidence that the plaintiff 
has a criminal record.  Specifically, he “had been convicted of swin-
dling schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly retirees 
by falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then using 
their money to pay his living expenses.”216  The materials note that the 
plaintiff’s most recent conviction had been fourteen years ago and 
that he had spent two years in prison.  The plaintiff objects to the in-
troduction of this testimony, even for the limited purpose of impeach-
ing his credibility, on the ground that the probative value of this old 
conviction does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect under 
the applicable evidentiary rule.  The judges are then asked to rule on 
the objection.  Finally, judges in both the control group and the sup-
pression group are asked to indicate how much they would award the 
plaintiff in compensatory damages. 
2.  Prior Criminal Conviction:  The Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the study of prior criminal convic-
tions.  The judges who ruled that the prior criminal convictions were 
not admissible awarded an average of 12% less in pain and suffering 
damages than did those judges who were not exposed to the plaintiff’s 
criminal history.  The difference between these two groups was mar-
ginally statistically significant, using a nonparametric test.217  Although 
 
213 Infra Appendix, p. 1338. 
214 Infra Appendix, p. 1339. 
215 Among the Arizona judges, two-thirds of the judges received the suppression 
condition and one-third received the control condition.  This was done because many 
of the judges in Minnesota admitted the testimony.  To try to create a more balanced 
design, we thus decided to oversample the suppression condition.  The results demon-
strate no differences in the awards from different judges, see infra Part II.D.2, and thus 
this oversampling is unlikely to have skewed the results. 
216 Infra Appendix, p. 1338. 
217 Mann-Whitney U = 2528.5, p = .075.  The suppression condition includes one 
$10 million award, which dwarfs the other awards and raises the mean award in the 
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the judges who sustained the objection and the judges who overruled 
the objection appear to have produced somewhat different awards, 
these differences were not significant.218 
Table 4:  Past Criminal Conviction:  Means and Quartile Results 
(in $1000s) 
Condition (and n) Mean 1st Quartile Median 3d Quartile 
Control (43) 778 300 500 1000 
Sustain (61) 685 200 400 800 
Suppression (73) 
Overrule (12) 406 163 275 713 
 
We also attempted to assess the effects of gender, court, and ex-
perience.  We performed these analyses on a logarithmic 
transformation of the raw awards so as to create a normal distribution 
of the awards.  We regressed the log of the award on condition (using 
only those judges who sustained the objection in the suppression 
condition), gender, court, and an interaction term of condition with 
gender, court, and experience.  We found no significant main effects 
or interactions for any of these terms. 
3.  Prior Criminal Conviction:  Discussion 
Exposure to the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction appears to 
have influenced the judges’ decisions, even though most judges ruled 
to suppress the information.  The mean awards were somewhat lower 
among judges who had seen the evidence and sustained the objection, 
and the distribution of awards was generally shifted downwards.  Much 
like mock jurors, judges seemed unable to ignore a prior conviction. 
Although the results revealed no statistically significant differences 
between the judges who ruled the conviction inadmissible and the 
judges who admitted the evidence, few conclusions can be drawn from 
this result.  The number of judges who admitted the conviction is too 
small to make a meaningful comparison.  Judges who admitted the 
conviction seemed to produce lower awards than judges who sup-
 
suppression-sustain condition by nearly $200,000.  This award, along with the general 
skewness of the distributions, makes the parametric test particularly inappropriate.  A 
t -test on the log-transformed data, however, also produced a marginally significant dif-
ference.  t(101) = 1.82, p = .07. 
218 Mann-Whitney U = 2298.5, p > .50.  A t -test on the log-transformed data also was 
not significant.  Two-sample t(68) = 0.67, p > .5. 
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pressed the conviction, but the trend did not approach significance, 
possibly due to the small number of judges who admitted the evi-
dence.  It could be that the judges who suppressed the conviction 
were able to discount the conviction to some extent.  The groups are 
not, however, completely comparable.  Judges who admitted the tes-
timony presumably did so because they believed that the testimony’s 
probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect.  
Hence, the judges who admitted the testimony probably gave it more 
weight than judges who suppressed it. 
These results support the general proposition that judges also 
have difficulty ignoring intrinsically excluded testimony.  The results 
leave the exact mechanisms for how the materials influenced the 
judges unidentified, however.  Because the past crime was one involv-
ing fraud, it could be that the judges discredited the plaintiff’s ac-
count of his injuries.  On the other hand, it might be that the judges 
who learned of it simply awarded less money to the plaintiff because 
they deemed him a socially undesirable character.  Either way, judges 
were affected by the evidence that they themselves had ruled inadmis-
sible.  Future versions of this study (in which the past crime is odious, 
such as child molestation, but not associated directly with fraud) could 
help disentangle these potential underlying mechanisms. 
E.  Postconviction Cooperation Agreement 
Our fifth scenario explores whether judges can disregard informa-
tion a prosecutor obtained from a cooperating criminal defendant 
and then inappropriately used against him in a sentencing hearing.  
When the government enters into a plea agreement containing a co-
operation clause, it is bound to honor the agreement.219  The govern-
ment is not permitted to renege on the agreement and use informa-
tion it uncovers from the defendant against that defendant.220  In the 
 
219 See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ooperation 
agreements, like plea bargains, may usefully be interpreted with principles borrowed 
from the law of contract. . . . [T]he government’s discretion does not grant it power to 
turn its back on its promises to the defendant under the cooperation agree-
ment . . . .”); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Coopera-
tion agreements, like plea bargains, are interpreted according to principles of contract 
law. . . . [T]he scope of the government’s discretion [does not] permit it to ignore or 
renege on contractual commitments to defendants.”). 
220 The federal sentencing guidelines themselves forbid the use of incriminating 
information provided by the defendant as part of a cooperation agreement with the 
prosecution.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.8 (2004). 
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event that a judge is exposed to such information, the judge should 
disregard it in sentencing the defendant.  Despite this, we expect the 
judges to be influenced by exposure to such information. 
1.  Postconviction Cooperation Agreement:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges might be influenced by such informa-
tion, we created a scenario entitled “Sentencing.”221  In this scenario, 
the participating judges learn that they are presiding in a criminal 
sentencing hearing.  Appearing in front of the judges is Sam Kaiser, 
who was found guilty of possession of 150 grams of methampheta-
mine, which carries a base offense level of “26” under the federal sen-
tencing guidelines.222 
Kaiser, who is twenty-seven years old, dropped out of high school 
when he was seventeen, has never held a job for long, is unmarried, 
and has no children.  The judges learn that Kaiser had several prior 
convictions for larceny and minor drug possession, so he has four 
“criminal history points” under the guidelines sum,223 which puts him 
in “Category III” for sentencing under the federal sentencing guide-
lines.224  The materials inform the judges that the appropriate sen-
tence for him is from 78 to 97 months, given his criminal history 
points and the offense level.225 
Following his conviction, Kaiser cooperated with the prosecution 
in exchange for a sentencing recommendation.  Additionally, as part 
of this agreement, the prosecution agreed that it would not use any of 
the information it learned from him against him. 
Judges in the control group also learn that “Kaiser revealed the 
name of his supplier, but nothing else of substance.”226  Judges in the 
suppression group learn that Kaiser “had helped his 30-year-old cousin 
produce methamphetamine in a basement laboratory,” and that “his 
cousin had a 15-year-old girlfriend who frequently ‘tried out’ their 
batches for them.”227  The judges in this group then learn that the 
 
221 Infra Appendix, pp. 1340-41. 
222 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(7) (providing for a base of-
fense level of 26 for possession of “[a]t least 50 G but less than 200 G of Metham-
phetamine”). 
223 Id. § 4A1.1(c). 
224 Id. § 5A. 
225 Id. 
226 Infra Appendix, p. 1340. 
227 Infra Appendix, p. 1340. 
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prosecution has asked them to add six levels to Kaiser’s offense level 
because “he had been engaged in the manufacture of methampheta-
mine in a fashion that had endangered a minor.”228  Under the guide-
lines, if such information was properly presented, it would warrant 
judges raising the offense level by that amount.229  If that were to hap-
pen here, Kaiser would face a sentence from 151 to 188 months under 
the guidelines.230  Kaiser’s attorney argues that the prosecution re-
neged on its deal and cannot use this information against him in sen-
tencing. 
Thereafter, the materials inform both groups of judges that “[n]o 
other circumstances supporting any additional enhancements, depar-
tures, or other adjustments are present.”231  The materials then ask the 
judges to sentence Kaiser. 
2.  Postconviction Cooperation Agreement:  The Results 
This information had an untoward effect on the sentences handed 
down by the judges.  All but one of the thirteen judges in the control 
condition sentenced Kaiser to 78 months, the shortest possible sen-
tence under the guidelines.  The only judge who deviated from this 
sentence departed downwardly, sentencing Kaiser to just 60 months 
(and was dropped from the analysis, having disregarded the instruc-
tions).232  In the suppression condition, 86.7% (13 out of 15) of the 
judges rejected the prosecution’s request to raise the offense level.  
Nonetheless, exposure to the negative information about the defen-
dant influenced their behavior.  In contrast to judges in the control 
condition, only 46.2% (6 out of 13) of these judges chose 78 months 
as the sentence.233  On average, the thirteen judges who rejected the 
prosecutor’s request sentenced Kaiser to 85.9 months in prison.  The 
difference between the control group judges and the suppression 
 
228 Infra Appendix, p. 1340. 
229 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(6)(C). 
230 Id. § 5A. 
231 Infra Appendix, p. 1341. 
232 Including this judge in the analysis would only have strengthened the observed 
effect of the improperly presented evidence. 
233 Taking as the dependent measure the binary decision of whether to give the 
defendant the minimum sentence, the difference between the two conditions was sig-
nificant.  Fisher’s exact p = .006. 
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group judges who denied the prosecution’s motion was statistically 
significant.234 
3.  Postconviction Cooperation Agreement:  Discussion 
Although nearly 90% of the judges determined that the informa-
tion the defendant provided while cooperating with the government 
could not be used against him at sentencing, the availability of this in-
formation increased the defendant’s sentence.  The information that 
the defendant provided about the nature of his offense seemed to al-
ter the judges’ impressions of him.  In the control condition, the 
judges may have viewed the defendant as just another hapless drug 
dealer for whom the guideline range was too severe.  All of the judges 
in the control condition imposed the minimum sentence.  When the 
defendant’s testimony revealed that he had endangered and abused a 
minor, however, judges meted out stiffer sentences.  Neither the gov-
ernment’s agreement not to use the information nor the court’s obli-
gation to enforce it protected this defendant from its effects on his 
sentence. 
The behavior of the judges in the control condition is also note-
worthy.  Except for one judge who inexplicably deviated below the 
sentencing minimum, all provided exactly the same sentence—the 
minimum under the guidelines.  Although complaints that the federal 
sentencing guidelines are too harsh in drug cases are common,235 
there is little direct empirical evidence that judges view them this 
way.236  Our study inadvertently provided some indirect evidence on 
 
234 An ordinary two-sample t -test cannot be run on these data due to the lack of 
variation among the control group.  However, the null hypothesis that the suppression 
group’s true mean is also 78 months can be rejected.  t(12) = 3.34, p = .006. 
235 See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution:  How 
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 87, 126 (2003) (“The currently pervasive mandatory minimum statutes make 
narcotics sentences indefensibly rigid, often unfair and unjustly harsh.”); Justice Kennedy 
Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at A16 (noting Justice Kennedy’s argument that 
sentencing guidelines need to be “revised downward”); John S. Martin Jr., Let Judges Do 
Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31 (announcing retirement due to the “dis-
tress I feel at being part of a sentencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid”) . 
236 In fact, the academic literature shows that judges disagree over the federal sen-
tencing guidelines and their effects.  Compare Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory 
Sentencing:  One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 16 (2003) (arguing 
that discrepancies in the treatment of drug offenders under the guidelines are “the 
most serious vice” in the guidelines), with Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 560 (2001) (“The guidelines . . . make a fairly sophisticated 
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this point.  In every other scenario we have presented, in both this pa-
per and in our prior research, we have found variations among 
judges—especially when the outcome consists of a continuous pa-
rameter (such as months or dollars), as opposed to a binary parameter 
(such as verdict or ruling).  That judges of different political parties, 
different genders, different amounts of experience, and doubtless 
with different attitudes toward the war on drugs all agree to sentence 
at the exact bottom of the guidelines range suggests that the judges 
perceive 78 months to be too harsh a sentence for possessing 150 
grams of methamphetamine. 
Finally, this study also has implications for the Supreme Court’s 
recent pronouncements on sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. Wash-
ington237 and United States v. Booker.238  In these cases, the Court struck 
down both a state sentencing scheme and the federal sentencing 
guidelines as inconsistent with the right to a jury trial.  The Court 
concluded that any fact that increases a defendant’s maximum sen-
tence must be submitted to a jury.239  The problem with the holding, 
from our perspective, is that statutory sentencing ranges can be quite 
broad.  Our results suggest that even if a judge does not have an ex-
plicit jury finding on a particular fact that would raise the upper limit 
of the defendant’s sentencing, evidence tending to prove this fact 
might still influence the judge in determining what sentence to im-
pose within that original range.  This is what occurred in our study.  As 
we have shown, sentencing guidelines do not eliminate the possibility 
of such extraneous influences.  Sentencing guidelines, however, miti-
gate the problem by confining the influence of this extraneous infor-
mation. 
 
effort to assess the weight of an offender’s prior record.”), and Angela LaBuda Collins, 
Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c):  Congressional Reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1343 n.156 (1999) (noting 
that Justice Breyer was a strong supporter of the guidelines during his tenure as Chief 
Judge of the First Circuit). 
237 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
238 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 239 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (“The Framers would not have thought it too much to 
demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State 
should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to ‘the unanimous 
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours’ rather than a lone employee of the 
State.” (citation omitted)), quoted with alterations in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752.  
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F.  Hindsight and Probable Cause 
Our sixth scenario explores whether judges can disregard the out-
come of a search when deciding whether the police had probable 
cause to conduct the search in the first place.  The Fourth Amend-
ment requires that police searches be based on “probable cause.”240  
Evidence obtained from a search conducted without probable cause is 
inadmissible on the ground that it violates the Fourth Amendment’s 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”241 
Despite this prohibition, judges required to rule on the legality of 
a search might have difficulty disregarding the outcome of the search 
due to the hindsight bias.242  In most aspects of life, the hindsight bias 
creates few problems because few occasions call for a reassessment of 
what could have been known in the past.  In the courtroom, however, 
repredicting the past is commonplace.243  Many situations, from de-
termining what accidents tort defendants should have been able to 
avoid to assessing whether an invention was “obvious” in patent law, 
require judges and jurors to ignore the known outcome and assess 
what was predictable ex ante. 
Likewise, when a judge must rule on the admissibility of the fruits 
of a search conducted without a warrant, she does so with the knowl-
edge that the search produced incriminating evidence.  If the hind-
sight bias affects judges’ assessments of probable cause, then judges in 
hindsight will admit evidence obtained under circumstances in which 
police could not have obtained a warrant in foresight.  Some com-
mentators244 and even the Supreme Court itself245 have suggested that 
 
240 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
241 Id. 
242 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
243 See Rachlinski, supra note 77, at 571 (explaining that despite the obstacle of ac-
curately assessing the predictability of outcomes, the law constantly requires courts to 
make these determinations). 
244 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 881, 915 (1991) (arguing that granting warrants before a magistrate knows 
whether the police will find evidence or whether the suspect is a criminal helps elimi-
nate judicial bias). 
245 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses 
the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and sub-
stitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the 
arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of 
hindsight judgment.”). 
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one of the principal purposes of requiring a warrant is to avoid mak-
ing assessments of probable cause entirely in hindsight. 
Previous studies suggest that the hindsight bias influences judges.  
In our earlier work, we found that judges overestimated the predict-
ability of outcomes on appeal.246  Other researchers have found that 
the hindsight bias influences judicial assessments of negligence.247  In 
these studies, researchers found that judges were more likely to iden-
tify conduct as unreasonable, negligent, or even reckless after learning 
that the conduct had produced an accident.  None of these studies di-
rectly addresses the issue of the hindsight bias in probable cause de-
terminations, although there is some evidence that mock jurors are in-
fluenced by it.248 
1.  Hindsight and Probable Cause:  The Scenario 
To determine whether judges might be influenced by the out-
come of a potentially defective search, we created and administered a 
scenario labeled “Fourth Amendment Issue.”249  In this scenario, we 
asked participating judges250 assigned to the control group to deter-
mine whether they would grant a warrant under the circumstances de-
scribed, and we asked participating judges assigned to the suppression 
 
246 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 801-03 (providing evidence 
that learning an alleged outcome on appeal significantly affected judges’ assessments 
of the most likely outcome). 
247 See John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of Audi-
tor Decisions:  Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 732 
(1993) (finding judges’ evaluations of auditor performance to be significantly biased 
by outcome information); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well:  The 
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 906 (1998) (finding a statisti-
cally insignificant trend towards hindsight effects among judges evaluating a negli-
gence case); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 
50-51 (1999) (presenting evidence of the role of hindsight bias on judicial decision 
making). 
248 See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Infor-
mation and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 65, 81-82 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) 
(finding mock jurors’ decisions affected by outcome information); Jonathan D. Cas-
per, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight 
Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 300 (1989) (finding, in a laboratory experiment, re-
sults consistent with hindsight bias). 
249 Infra Appendix, pp. 1342-43. 
250 We gave Version 1 of this scenario to all of the judges in the urban jurisdiction 
and Version 2 to all of the judges in Minneapolis.  Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
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condition to rule on the admissibility of evidence collected without a 
warrant under the same circumstances.251 
In both cases, the judges learn that a police officer was on patrol 
in a parking lot outside a large arena hosting a rock concert.  The of-
ficer noticed a well-dressed, nervous-looking man exit a BMW and fid-
dle with something in the trunk of his car.  The man then met a 
friend, bought tickets to the event, and entered the arena.  Thirty 
minutes later, the officer noticed that one of the BMW’s windows was 
rolled down.  Concerned that the car might be burglarized, he ap-
proached the car to close the window.  Upon arriving at the car, the 
officer stated that he “smelled something that he believed, based on a 
demonstration at a training session several years earlier, to be burnt 
methamphetamine.  He looked inside the car and didn’t see any 
drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local map, and a couple of 
empty beer cans.”252 
In the foresight condition, the materials then stated that the po-
lice officer requested a telephonic warrant to search the trunk of the 
car.  The materials asked simply, “Will you issue the warrant?”253  In the 
hindsight condition, the materials stated that “[b]ased on these obser-
vations,” the police officer searched the trunk of the car.  The search 
produced “10 pounds of methamphetamine, other drug parapherna-
lia, and a gun that had recently been fired.”254  The gun turned out to 
match a weapon used to murder a drug dealer across town earlier that 
evening.  The driver was then arrested and tried.  The materials noted 
that the defense attorney has moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained in the search, arguing that the police officer lacked probable 
cause for the search.  The materials then asked, “Will you allow the 
evidence to be admitted?”255 
 
251 Infra Appendix, p. 1342. 
252 Infra Appendix, p. 1342. 
253 Infra Appendix, p. 1342. 
254 Infra Appendix, p. 1342. 
255 Infra Appendix, p. 1343.  There was an error in the phrasing of the two avail-
able answers in the version of this question given to the unnamed jurisdiction that 
makes the answers confusing.  Specifically, the judges were given the question “Will 
you rule to suppress the evidence?” and two options:  “Yes, there was probable cause to 
justify the search” and “No, there was not probable cause to justify the search.”  Never-
theless, most of the judges reported understanding what the question was asking, and 
so we include these results here.  Also, as discussed, their results did not differ from 
those of the federal magistrate judges later tested in Minneapolis, for whom we cor-
rected the error. 
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The materials thus take advantage of an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Police officers who face “exigent circumstances” may 
undertake the search even without a warrant, so long as they have 
probable cause.256  Automobile searches are considered per se exigent 
circumstances.257  Nevertheless, police sometimes do request warrants 
for automobile searches to ensure the admissibility of evidence uncov-
ered during the search.  Hence, both the hindsight and the foresight 
conditions represent plausible variations on the underlying story. 
2.  Hindsight and Probable Cause:  The Results 
In foresight, 23.9% (11 out of 46) of the judges concluded that 
there was probable cause for a search and granted a warrant; in hind-
sight, 27.7% (13 out of 47) of the judges concluded that there was 
probable cause for a search and ruled the testimony admissible.  
There obviously was not a statistically significant difference between 
these two groups.258  Logistic regression of the decision on court, gen-
der, experience, and the interaction of these variables with condition 
revealed no significant effects. 
It is possible that the lack of a statistically significant effect might 
have resulted from a limited sample size.  We note, however, that the 
sample size was sufficient in that it had an 87.4% chance of detecting a 
significant or marginally significant difference if the true difference 
between foresight and hindsight was 30 percentage points.259  In other 
words, if the true difference between the foresight and hindsight con-
ditions was actually similar in magnitude to the differences found in 
the attorney-client and rape-shield problems, we likely could have de-
tected a significant effect in this problem.  This likelihood drops to 
56.5% and 20.5% for twenty- and ten-percentage-point differences, re-
spectively. 
 
256 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (“[I]f truly exigent circum-
stances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth Amendment principles.”). 
257 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (holding that police may 
search automobiles based on probable cause without a warrant); see also United States 
v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1985) (allowing police to search containers without a 
warrant when the containers were properly seized from an automobile at an earlier 
time). 
258 Fisher’s exact p = .68. 
259 This analysis assumes that the population percentage in foresight is 24%, which 
is what we found. 
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3.  Hindsight and Probable Cause:  Discussion 
Our study produced no evidence that the hindsight bias affected 
the judges’ assessments of probable cause.  Knowledge of the fruits of 
the search had no discernible effect on judges’ decision making.  
Judges were able to ignore the damning evidence that the search pro-
duced and make essentially the same decision as judges who were un-
aware of what the search would uncover.  The results also reveal only 
the slightest trend towards a hindsight bias. 
These results are somewhat surprising.  The vast literature on the 
hindsight bias includes virtually no studies that fail to uncover evi-
dence of the hindsight bias in ex post assessments of ex ante prob-
abilities.  A handful of hindsight-bias studies report only non-significant 
differences between hindsight and foresight conditions.260  So what ac-
counts for our findings?  It is possible that the facts we presented are 
simply anomalous, but we doubt it.  The circumstances presented 
closely match the kinds of situations that produce the hindsight bias.  
The materials asked judges in hindsight to assess how events must 
have seemed to the police officer beforehand.  The materials also in-
clude some ambiguous facts that could easily be reinterpreted as more 
sinister after one learns what the fruits of the search were.  These cir-
cumstances produced the hindsight bias in numerous other studies. 
Nor do we think that judges have necessarily learned how to avoid 
the hindsight bias.  As noted, several other studies show judges are in-
fluenced by hindsight bias in other situations.261  Furthermore, we did 
not observe any effect of experience on the bias.  That result under-
mines the suggestion that judges eventually learn how to make deci-
sions without being influenced by the hindsight bias in general. 
One possibility is that “probable cause” assessments do not actually 
depend upon the likelihood that a search produces incriminating evi-
dence.  Rather, probable cause assessments might reflect a judicial ef-
fort to identify police conduct thought to be socially appropriate.  
Thus, the court simply evaluates whether the conduct is appropriate 
or excessive.  If so, the results of our study are still surprising.  It is 
hard to imagine that the likelihood that the search would produce in-
criminating evidence is somehow unrelated to the assessment of 
whether the police engaged in a socially appropriate search.  Fur-
 
260 See Rachlinski, supra note 77, at 580-81 (reviewing previous research on the 
hindsight bias). 
261 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. 
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thermore, a judgment of appropriate police conduct would also seem 
likely to be influenced by the outcome of the search. 
Another possibility is that judges have developed informal heuris-
tics which they use to assess probable cause.262  Perhaps judges do not 
attempt to assess probable cause de novo every time they encounter a 
probable cause issue.  Rather, they may have rules of thumb for de-
termining probable cause that address common situations, such as 
vague assertions by police officers that they thought they smelled 
drugs.  Some judges might have just developed the habit of refusing to 
grant warrants, or admitting evidence seized after a search, when the 
only real basis for probable cause consists of such an assertion.  If 
judges adopt a set of simple, uncomplicated heuristics to assess prob-
able cause, they might not be so easily swayed by the outcome of the 
search.  Sorting out these issues will require further study. 
G.  Inadmissible Criminal Confession 
Our final scenario explores whether judges can disregard informa-
tion gleaned from an inadmissible confession in a criminal case.  In its 
famous Miranda263 and Escobedo264 decisions, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination as 
providing several procedural safeguards to criminal suspects.  Among 
them is the requirement that once a suspect in custody requests a law-
yer, the police must cease interrogation.  If the police continue with 
the interrogation, the resulting confession is inadmissible.265 
Judges often confront an uncomfortable reality when sitting in a 
case involving an illegally obtained confession.  Under Miranda and 
Escobedo, the judge has an obligation to suppress the confession, but 
because the confession is often among the most important pieces of 
evidence against the defendant, the act of suppressing the confession 
may undermine the prosecution’s case against him.  Thus, we expect 
that it will be difficult for judges to ignore the suppressed confession. 
 
262 In a different context, Hillary Sale has argued that judges have developed sim-
ple heuristics to guide their decision making in securities fraud cases.  Hillary A. Sale, 
Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 904-05 (2002). 
263 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
264 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
265 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (“If . . . he indicates in any manner and at any 
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there 
can be no questioning.”). 
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Most prior studies indicate that mock jurors commonly ignore in-
structions to disregard constitutionally infirm evidence.266  In particu-
lar, mock jurors pay attention to the details of coerced confessions, 
regardless of whether the evidence had been deemed constitutionally 
infirm and inadmissible.  To be sure, extreme police conduct does in-
crease the extent to which mock jurors can discount such evidence.267  
Likewise, a series of studies of the influence of illegal wiretaps on ver-
dicts reveals that mock jurors have some ability to discount such evi-
dence.268  So to some degree, even mock jurors seem able to account 
for constitutional constraints.  But on the whole, mock jurors seem 
willing to convict defendants they perceive to be guilty, even if the 
damning evidence is deemed inadmissible for extrinsic constitutional 
reasons.269 
1.  Inadmissible Criminal Confession:  The Scenario 
To assess whether judges can ignore such constitutionally infirm 
evidence, we created a scenario entitled “Evaluation of a Robbery 
Trial.”270  In this scenario, the participating judges271 learn that they are 
presiding in a bench trial involving a criminal prosecution for armed 
robbery.  Bench trials are not the norm in criminal cases, but they do 
occur.272  We provided the judges with an explanation for why the de-
fendant sought a bench trial in this case:  “Concerned that he is a 
 
266 See Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury:  An Experimental 
Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997) (stating that the 
presence of a confession “powerfully increased the conviction rate,” even when mock 
jurors were told to disregard the confession because it was coerced); Kassin & 
Wrightsman, supra note 94, at 504 (concluding that instructions to disregard coerced 
confessions may not be effective). 
267 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 94, at 491, 496 (citing studies that show 
people are less likely to disregard negative inducement of confessions, and finding that 
people view negatively induced confessions as less voluntary than positively induced 
ones). 
268 Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1047-53; Sommers & Kassin, supra note 97, 
at 1372-73; Werner, Kagehiro & Strube, supra note 95, at 631-32. 
269 See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1051 (asserting that experimental re-
sults suggest that jurors are influenced not by a judge’s ruling per se, but by the causal 
basis for that ruling). 
270 Infra Appendix, pp. 1344-45. 
271 We gave this scenario to all of the judges who attended the conference in Mari-
copa County.  Supra Table 1, p. 1285. 
272 See MECHAM, supra note 109, at 162-64 tbl.C-7 (reporting 3618 nonjury trials in 
criminal cases and 3500 jury trials between September 2002 and September 2003 in 
federal court). 
  
1320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1251 
 
member of a small minority in the community and will face an un-
sympathetic jury, Mr. Jones has waived his right to a jury trial.  You are 
thus presiding in a bench trial.”273 
The judges learn that the perpetrator, wearing a ski mask and 
brandishing a gun, walked into an empty 7-Eleven store at night and 
demanded that the lone employee place money in a shopping bag.  
The cashier stuffed $200 into the bag, and the perpetrator ran off, 
discarding both the gun and ski mask on the way out.  The cashier ob-
served that the suspect got into a white Ford Taurus with an Arizona 
license plate bearing “GB” as the last two characters.  The police re-
trieved the gun and mask but could obtain no fingerprints from them. 
The police surveyed the neighborhood for a matching car.  They 
found one ten blocks away that was a close match (the last two charac-
ters of the license plate on the Ford Taurus were “C8”).  The police 
traced the car through the Department of Motor Vehicles and found 
the address of the owner.  They knocked on the door of his apart-
ment, and he answered.  He matched the build and race of the perpe-
trator and was wearing similar clothes (although this consisted of jeans 
and a white t-shirt).  The police then insisted that he accompany them 
to the station house where they led him to a locked room, read him 
his Miranda rights, and began interrogating him.  At the police sta-
tion, they allowed the cashier to listen in on the interrogation, and the 
cashier said, “that sounds like the guy.”274  The police then arrested the 
defendant and obtained a warrant to search his apartment.  The 
search produced shopping bags similar to the one used by the perpe-
trator, black gloves, and more than $200 in cash, but nothing else in-
criminating. 
In addition to the aforementioned information, the judges as-
signed to the suppression condition learn the following: 
The police continued questioning the defendant.  Even though the de-
fendant clearly requested a lawyer, twice, the police refused to call one 
and continued the interrogation.  Two hours later, the defendant con-
fessed, and agreed to write out a description of the crime.  His written 
description matched the events perfectly, including the fact that he dis-
carded the ski mask and gun outside the store (which the police had not 
told him).
275
 
 
273 Infra Appendix, p. 1344. 
274 Infra Appendix, p. 1344. 
275 Infra Appendix, p. 1345. 
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The materials stated that “the defendant’s attorney has moved to 
suppress the confession, arguing that the interrogation violated the 
defendant’s rights under Miranda by continuing after the defendant 
had requested an attorney.”276  The judges in the suppression condi-
tion were then asked whether they would grant the motion to suppress 
the evidence.  Finally, the materials in both the control and suppres-
sion conditions asked the judges to respond to the following question:  
“Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you convict the 
defendant?”277 
2.  Inadmissible Criminal Confession:  The Results 
In the control condition, 17.7% (9 out of 51) of the judges con-
victed the defendant.  In the suppression condition, 20.7% (11 out of 
53) of the judges who suppressed the confession convicted the defen-
dant.278  The responses of the judges in these two groups were not sta-
tistically significantly different from one another.279  Logistic regres-
sion of the decision on court, gender, experience and the interaction 
of these variables with condition revealed no significant effects. 
As with the probable cause scenario, the lack of a significant effect 
might be attributable to the limited sample size, rather than to the 
lack of any real difference.  If the true difference were 30 percentage 
points, however, our study had a 93.4% chance of producing a signifi-
cant or marginally significant effect.280  This percentage drops to 
67.1% and 25.6% for detecting differences of 10 and 20 percentage 
points, respectively. 
3.  Inadmissible Criminal Confession:  Discussion 
The judges in this study appeared able to ignore the evidence of 
the improperly obtained confession.  The differences between the 
control and the suppression conditions were barely distinguishable.  
The judges were able to uphold the policies underlying the Miranda 
doctrine and ignore the incriminating but inadmissible evidence. 
 
276 Infra Appendix, p. 1345. 
277 Infra Appendix, p. 1345. 
278 Only one of the 54 judges assigned to the experimental condition ruled that 
the confession was admissible. 
279 Fisher’s exact p = .69. 
280 This analysis assumes that 17% is the true conviction percentage in the control 
condition. 
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These materials might be idiosyncratic, but we suspect they are 
not.  The confession in our materials was not an unreliable product of 
coercion; it included information that was known only to the perpe-
trator, indicating that the defendant had in fact committed the rob-
bery.  It could be that the judges missed this important fact, because 
the materials do not highlight it.  We did not ask the judges to assess 
the likelihood that the defendant actually committed the crime, which 
would have enabled us to measure this directly.  In our other scenar-
ios, however—particularly the sexual assault scenario—important de-
tails did not escape the judges’ notice and instead had a powerful ef-
fect on their judgment.  We have no reason to think that judges failed 
to notice this fact. 
It appears instead that the judges simply managed to ignore the 
tainted evidence.  The scenario includes ambiguities that provided 
plenty of fodder for reconstructing or justifying a guilty verdict.  Not 
only were the judges able to disregard their knowledge that the de-
fendant was guilty, they were also able to keep that information from 
coloring their assessment of the other facts.  How they did this is un-
clear.  It might be that judges were simply compensating for their own 
knowledge.  Perhaps judges, aware that their thinking was influenced 
by the inadmissible confession, implicitly raised the threshold for their 
willingness to convict.  Even as their knowledge influenced their un-
derstanding of the ambiguous facts, the judges also demanded more 
certainty.  Further study is necessary to sort this out. 
Compared with other scenarios, this scenario and the hindsight 
bias scenario raise more serious questions about the applicability of 
our results to the real world.  It might be easy enough in hypothetical 
assessments to assert that an important constitutional principle would 
prevent one from convicting a defendant.  Exonerating a real, live de-
fendant that a judge knows to be guilty might be a more serious mat-
ter.  Judges, however, do this when they rule critical evidence inadmis-
sible on constitutional grounds in jury trials, knowing full well that the 
ruling will destroy the prosecution’s case.  Whether judges ignore 
their knowledge of inadmissible evidence in deciding real cases re-
mains uncertain.  These results indicate, however, that judges might 
have more ability to ignore such evidence than intuition might sug-
gest. 
 
2005] CAN JUDGES IGNORE INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION? 1323 
 
H.  Summary and Interpretation 
In our previous article on federal magistrate judges, we demon-
strated that judges, like laypersons and other expert decision makers, 
are subject to “heuristics and biases” or “cognitive illusions” when 
making judgments.281  Based on the research we conducted for that ar-
ticle, we reached the unsurprising conclusion that “[j]udges . . . are 
human.”282  The research we report in this Article corroborates that 
conclusion.  Judges are indeed human; like jurors, they are often un-
able to “close the [v]alves of [their] attention.”283 
Taken together, our studies show that judges do not disregard in-
admissible information when making substantive decisions in either 
civil or criminal cases.  We think the reason is that they are unwittingly 
influenced by inadmissible information and that they cannot ignore it 
much of the time.  Others might argue that our studies show that 
judges are capable of disregarding inadmissible information but that 
they choose not to do so.  They might claim that judges purposefully 
flout the evidentiary rules in favor of selecting the substantive out-
come that they think is just or that comports with their personal policy 
preferences.  In the rape-shield problem we describe above, for exam-
ple, the judges who learned of the victim’s sexual history were much 
more likely than the judges who did not learn this information to free 
the defendant from criminal liability.284  While we believe that these 
results show that judges had difficulty ignoring the inadmissible sexual 
history, and that their exposure to it induced them to exonerate the 
defendant, it is also possible that the judges were capable of disregard-
ing this information but chose not to do so because they felt that jus-
tice required them to free the defendant from criminal liability. 
Although this alternative account is plausible, we think it is less 
compelling than our own interpretation for several reasons.  First, the 
weight of psychological evidence—from general psychological studies, 
mock juror studies, and the one prior study of judges—suggests that 
people in general have great difficulty deliberately disregarding in-
formation.  Second, although we do not consider ourselves naïve, we 
 
281 See generally Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108 (noting that five dif-
ferent “illusions”—anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representative heuristic, and 
egocentric biases—all had significant impacts on judicial decision making). 
282 Id. at 821. 
283 EMILY DICKINSON, COMPLETE POEMS, No. 303 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1970). 
284 See supra Part III.C. 
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are inclined to believe that trial judges generally attempt to comply with 
the evidentiary rules rather than merely selecting the substantive out-
come they prefer.  Finally, we think our interpretation is more consis-
tent with our results.  Take, for example, the settlement scenario we 
described above.285  We believe the only sensible interpretation of this 
study is that the judges were unable to disregard the settlement de-
mands when they set damages in the case; it strains credulity to think 
that they could have ignored the demands but chose instead to award 
less in the low-anchor condition and more in the high-anchor condi-
tion to pursue a (nonobvious) sense of justice. 
The pattern of results we observed in these seven scenarios defies 
easy explanation.  One might be tempted to assert that judicial solici-
tude for constitutional rights explains the results in the last two sce-
narios, both of which had constitutional dimensions.  We doubt, how-
ever, that judges take constitutionally inspired rules of admissibility 
any more or less seriously than the non-constitutionally inspired rules 
implicated by our other problems.  Certainly, it is hard to see why 
judges would treat the attorney-client privilege with any less care than 
Miranda violations. 
Alternatively, it also appears that judges were less able to ignore 
inadmissible evidence when they were making factual determinations 
that were less amenable to judicial review.  In the first five scenarios, 
the inadmissible evidence supported:  lower or higher damage awards, 
a judgment for the defense in a civil case, an acquittal in a criminal 
case, and a longer criminal sentence.  Some of these issues are not 
even subject to appeal, and the others would result in reversals only in 
extraordinary circumstances.  By contrast, in the two scenarios in 
which the judge ignored the inadmissible evidence, it supported a 
finding of probable cause for a search in a criminal case and a guilty 
verdict in a criminal case.  Both constitute decisions that are likely to 
be appealed and possibly overturned if deemed erroneous.  Thus, 
judges were more likely to be influenced by inadmissible information 
if appellate review was deferential or unlikely.  Whether this theory 
truly explains the pattern of results, however, would require more 
data.  
 
285 See supra Part III.A. 
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IV.  PRESCRIPTIONS 
We are somewhat reluctant to make policy recommendations on 
the basis of the limited data we have collected for this Article.  Our 
findings do raise important questions for the justice system, however.  
Judges are the key players in this system.  They decide a sizable per-
centage of civil cases at trial,286 and they decide many more cases on 
motion than they do at trial.287  If their judgments at trial and their de-
cisions on motions are tainted by inadmissible evidence, the fairness 
of the justice system may be undermined. 
We believe our results support the following three policy recom-
mendations. 
A.  Separating “Managerial Judging” from Adjudication 
We first propose that courts should separate judges’ “manage-
rial”288 functions from their “adjudicative” functions as a way of reduc-
ing the likelihood that judges will be influenced by inadmissible evi-
dence they encounter during pretrial proceedings when making 
merits-based decisions on motions or at trial.289  Courts, in other words, 
should adopt a kind of divided decision making.  For example, courts 
might emulate the allocation of tasks in some federal district courts in 
which magistrate judges resolve discovery disputes and conduct set-
tlement conferences while the district judges decide substantive mo-
tions and preside over trials as the fact finders.  This could be done 
whether there are two types of judges, or just one.  Two judges could 
be assigned to each case, with one judge addressing the merits and the 
other judge deciding everything else.  They could then swap roles on 
alternating cases. 
Alternatively, courts could divide case management into several 
subparts, such as litigation motions, settlement, and trial, and assign 
 
286 See supra note 109. 
287 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:  An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 
1100 n.17 (1996) (citing a study where 24% of the 1649 federal and state cases were 
terminated by some form of adjudication other than trial, such as arbitration or dis-
missal on the merits). 
288 See Resnik, supra note 34, at 386 (describing managerial judging as involvement, 
for example, in pretrial case development). 
 289 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22, § 22.91, at 446-47 (“Judges who have 
been involved in unsuccessful settlement negotiations sometimes turn over to another 
judge the responsibility for trying the case because they have been privy to information 
on the merits of the case or on issues that would otherwise not have been revealed.”). 
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judges to each task for all cases.290  Such “master calendar” systems are 
common in many state courts and were common in the federal courts 
until the late 1960s.291  Finally, courts might adopt rules prohibiting 
the judge assigned to try the case from participating in settlement 
conferences involving that case.  Indeed, various courts, in largely 
piecemeal fashion, have adopted each of these reforms.292 
This approach to the “difficulty of deliberately disregarding” prob-
lem is not without its costs.  In the normal course in federal court, 
judges are assigned to particular cases and oversee them from begin-
ning to end.  This is efficient in that one judge is familiar with the 
facts, applicable law, procedural history, relationship between the par-
ties, and so forth.293  Under a system of divided decision making, a dif-
ferent judge might resolve a discovery dispute, rule on a pretrial mo-
tion, supervise settlement, and try the case.  Each of those judges 
would have to get up to speed on the case, at least well enough to re-
solve whatever matters are in front of that particular judge. 
Still, the benefits of this approach might outweigh its costs.  This 
approach would dramatically decrease, though certainly not eliminate, 
the likelihood that a trial judge rendering a merits-based decision 
would have been exposed to inadmissible information before trial.  
Consider, for example, the settlement scenario we described above.294  
If that dispute had been litigated in a court characterized by the kind 
 
 290 See Hon. James M. Carter, Effective Calendar Control—Objectives and Methods, 29 
F.R.D. 227, 237-40 (1961) (describing the principal advantages and disadvantages of 
master calendar systems and individual assignment calendar systems). 
291 See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1561, 1587 (2003) (describing the trend from master calendars to single-judge assign-
ment). 
292 See, e.g., E.D. CAL. L.R. 72-302(c)(1) (referring all discovery motions to magis-
trate judges); N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 7-2 (“A settlement conference generally will be con-
ducted by a Magistrate Judge, but in some limited circumstances may be conducted by 
a District Judge.  Upon written stipulation of all parties, the assigned Judge . . . may 
conduct a settlement conference.”); see also Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role 
for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 131, 144-47 
(2001) (explaining a “central criticism of judicial mediation . . . that, not only is it a 
waste of resources for a federal judge to act as mediator, but it is also unethical for a 
judge to mediate a case that appears on his own docket”).  
 293 See Committee on the Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Report Evaluating the Individual Assignment System in the Southern District of New 
York After Three Years Experience, 69 F.R.D. 493, 497 (1976) (attributing a nearly 40% re-
duction in civil caseload over a three-year period to the conversion of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York to an individual assignment sys-
tem). 
294 See supra Part III.A. 
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of divided decision making we are proposing here, plaintiff’s counsel 
would have voiced his client’s demands not to the eventual trial judge, 
but rather to a settlement judge.  Thus, the trial judge would have 
made her damage award without having been exposed to the inadmis-
sible settlement demand. 
B.  Further Justification for the Jury Trial 
We also recommend that jurisdictions favor another form of di-
vided decision making.  Juries have been the targets of much criticism, 
especially in recent years.295  The data we report in this Article, how-
ever, suggest that even if these criticisms are valid, other reasons sup-
port continued reliance on jury trials rather than bench trials.  In our 
earlier study of judges, we made a similar recommendation, arguing 
that “those clamoring for judges to replace juries should proceed with 
caution” because juries may be able to make better decisions than 
judges in some circumstances.296  Here, we reiterate that recommenda-
tion, though we do so on a slightly different basis. 
Both jurors and judges are likely to have difficulty disregarding in-
admissible evidence, but judges presiding in a jury trial can protect ju-
ries from encountering inadmissible evidence in a way that they can-
not protect themselves.  Most obviously, jurors will never be exposed 
to the inadmissible evidence that judges encounter during the pretrial 
phase of litigation.  Moreover, even during the trial itself, judges have 
procedural devices at their disposal, such as in camera review, to enable 
them to review potentially inadmissible evidence outside the presence 
of the jury.  In short, the exclusionary rules operate best in a system of 
divided decision making in which the judge serves as gatekeeper and 
the jury serves as fact finder. 
As a related matter, these results suggest that clear rules of evi-
dence (such as the blanket prohibition on admissibility of privileged 
information, absent crime or fraud) have an advantage over standards 
for admissibility (such as the rule allowing old criminal convictions to 
be admitted if they are highly relevant).  Standards encourage parties 
 
295 See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton, Susette M. Talarico & Richard E. Dunn, Another Brick 
in the Wall:  An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 
1097 (2000) (noting the juries have been “the target of much criticism by proponents 
of tort reform”); Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury:  Can Reality Be Found 
in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 233-34 (1998) (discussing attacks on the jury 
system by well-funded interest groups). 
296 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 827. 
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to present evidence to the judge in an effort to have it admitted, 
whereas rules might discourage such activity.  Consequently, standards 
for admissibility will force judges to review more evidence, and possi-
bly be affected by it regardless of whether it is admitted, than clear 
rules would. 
C.  Establishing Guidelines for Civil Damages 
Third, and finally, we worry that judges might be particularly vul-
nerable to the inappropriate influence of inadmissible information 
when assessing damages.  Judges supervising settlement conferences, 
for instance, might inadvertently be exposed to inadmissible anchors, 
like settlement demands or insurance policy limits, or to other inad-
missible information that might influence their assessment of dam-
ages, like whether the defendant in a tort suit has taken subsequent 
remedial measures.  This is of particular concern when judges must 
award damages that are inherently difficult to quantify, such as “pain 
and suffering” damages or punitive damages.  These kinds of damages 
seem particularly vulnerable to untoward influences such as anchor-
ing.297  Others have expressed the concern that these influences affect 
juries;298 our results suggest that judges are also vulnerable.  The re-
sults we report in this Article provide an argument for limiting the fact 
finder’s discretion in this area, whether that fact finder is a judge or a 
jury. 
Judges, like jurors, are vulnerable to inappropriate influences on 
their determination of damage awards.  In our earlier works and here, 
we observed both enormous variation in the damage awards that 
judges felt to be appropriate and the undesirable influence of anchor-
ing.  We recommend that legislatures or courts adopt damage sched-
ules, akin to criminal sentencing guidelines, to structure and confine 
judicial discretion.  Our goal is not “tort reform”; we are not advocat-
ing damage caps.  Nor are we advocating ranges so narrow or inflexi-
ble that they unduly deprive judges and juries of their discretion.  
Rather, we suggest that jurisdictions adopt guidelines to inform fact-
finder discretion in awarding damages in order to prevent or limit the 
 
297 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP 
VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  HOW JURIES DECIDE 244-48 (2002) (discussing the effect 
of anchoring on punitive damages). 
 298 Id. 
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extent of distortions resulting from limitations on human cognitive 
ability.299 
The research on anchoring, in fact, provides insights into the po-
tential value of even a nonbinding damage schedule, akin to workers’ 
compensation systems.  The inappropriate influence of anchoring 
arises from the arbitrary nature of some anchors available to trial 
judges as they determine the appropriate damage award.  Damage re-
quests by attorneys are self-serving, awards in past cases can be idio-
syncratic, and reliance on numbers discussed during settlement talks 
can undermine the settlement process.  Damage awards taken from 
an agreed schedule, however, would ideally represent a consensus view 
of an appropriate award and hence would inject a meaningful anchor 
into the process.  Judges could use a damage schedule as a starting 
point and then adjust as may be appropriate. 
What we propose for civil damages, in effect, is adoption of some-
thing like the federal criminal sentencing system as it exists today, af-
ter the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker.300  As Justice 
Breyer explained in a separate opinion, the Court in Booker only de-
clared the sentencing guidelines unconstitutional to the extent that 
they are binding on a sentencing judge’s decision.301  Federal district 
judges must still calculate the guidelines range in determining crimi-
nal sentences.302  The guidelines will, in effect, provide a meaningful 
anchor to guide sentencing.  A similar procedure would provide 
greater predictability and equity to damage determinations in civil 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Some of the changes to the rules of evidence and procedure sug-
gested by empirical research in psychology may seem too novel or 
costly to be considered seriously.  As we learn more about human de-
 
299 See Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade & Ritov, supra note 146, at 1183 (suggesting 
that the remedy for bias is the adoption of guidelines). 
300 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
301 Id. at 764 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court in part) (“[W]e must sever and ex-
cise two specific statutory provisions:  the provision that requires sentencing courts to 
impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range . . . and the provision that 
sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from 
the applicable Guidelines range . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
302 Id. at 767 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must 
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”). 
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cision making and the operation of our justice system, however, it is 
likely that we will eventually accept the need for fine-tuning, and per-
haps even significant changes.  As Professor Damaška has observed: 
As science continues to change the social world, greater transformations 
of factual inquiry lie ahead for all justice systems.  These transformations 
could turn out to be as momentous as those that occurred in the twilight 
of the Middle Ages, when magical forms of proof retreated before the 
prototypes of our present evidentiary technology.
303
 
Of course, it would be prudent to conduct further research before 
significant changes are made.  As studies of jury decision making have 
shown, well-intentioned efforts to solve problems may be ineffective, 
and sometimes only succeed in making the problem worse.304  In addi-
tion, because the rules of evidence and procedure are merely parts of 
the larger legal system, the collateral consequences of tinkering with 
some parts while leaving others untouched must be taken into ac-
count.305  If the results of existing research are confirmed, however, we 
may have a responsibility to make the changes sooner rather than 
later.  Judicial decisions have serious consequences for litigants, and 
undue delay in eliminating sources of error would undermine our 
commitment to accurate and just adjudication.306  Litigants, courts, 
and the community as a whole can only benefit if legal procedures are 
updated to keep pace with progress in the understanding of human 
decision making. 
The results of our studies show that judges frequently cannot 
“close the valves of [their] attention.”307  The presumption that people 
 
303 DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 151; see also Julius Stone, The Decline of Jury Trial and 
the Law of Evidence, 3 RES JUDICATAE 144, 148 (1947) (describing the “overhaul” of the 
evidence rules, “in the light of changing methods of trial,” as “the major task of our 
century in this branch of the law”). 
304 Broeder, supra note 79, at 753-54. 
305 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (noting that much of 
the law regarding evidence and good character is “archaic, paradoxical and full of 
compromises and compensations by which a rational advantage to one side is offset by 
a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other,” but “somehow it has proved a worka-
ble even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a 
wise and strong trial court,” and pulling “one misshapen stone out of the grotesque 
structure” would more likely “upset its present balance” than “establish a rational edi-
fice”). 
306 See FED. R. EVID. 102 (describing the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as promoting “the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined”). 
307 See supra note 283. 
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can ignore what they know, or use it for some purposes but not for 
other purposes, may sometimes be true, but often is little more than a 
convenient fiction.308  This may mean that judicial decision making is 
not as accurate as we hope it is.  The time has come to start thinking 
about how we are going to solve that problem. 
 
308 See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (“A fiction is either (1) a state-
ment propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false 
statement recognized as having utility.”). 
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APPENDIX:  STIMULUS MATERIALS 
Assessment of Damages 
Imagine that you are presiding over an automobile accident case 
in which the parties have agreed to a bench trial.  The plaintiff is a 31-
year-old male schoolteacher and the defendant is a large package-
delivery service.  The plaintiff was sideswiped by a truck driven erratic-
ally by one of the defendant’s drivers.  As a result of the accident, the 
plaintiff broke three ribs and severely injured his right arm.  He spent 
a week in the hospital, and missed six weeks of work.  The injuries to 
his right arm were so severe as to require amputation.  (He was right-
handed.) 
The parties have stipulated that the accident was caused solely by 
the negligent driving of the defendant’s employee.  The parties have 
settled the plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses, and the plaintiff’s 
economic claims for lost wages and the like.  The only remaining issue 
in the lawsuit is the amount of damages the plaintiff should receive for 
pain and suffering and the loss of his right arm. 
In an effort to settle the case, the parties requested that you pre-
side over a settlement conference before the commencement of the 
trial.  During the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney con-
fided in you that his client [Low anchor version and its control:  could use 
the money and wanted to eliminate any possibility of an appeal. / High 
anchor version and its control:  was intent upon collecting a significant 
monetary payment.]  [Low anchor version:  He stated that his client 
would be willing to settle for $175,000.]  [High anchor version:  He 
stated that his client would not be willing to settle for less than 
$10,000,000.]  Nevertheless, the parties were unable to reach a settle-
ment and the case proceeded to trial.  The settlement discussions are, 
of course, not admissible evidence at trial under Rule ___ of the ___ 
Rules of Evidence. 
The evidence presented at trial included testimony from the 
plaintiff, a young father, that he could no longer play recreational 
softball, or even play catch with his son.  Although the plaintiff has 
continued teaching, he testified that doing his job is somewhat more 
difficult, and that he is subject to periodic ridicule by the students.  
Plaintiff also described the severe pain he endured before arriving at 
the hospital, during the surgery to amputate his arm, and during his 
post-surgical therapy. 
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Although both parties presented arguments, neither suggested a 
specific figure, leaving the amount to be awarded entirely up to you.  
How much would you award plaintiff for pain and suffering and loss 
of his right arm? 
$_______________________
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Evaluation of a Contract Dispute 
Suppose that you are presiding over a bench trial in a case in 
which the plaintiff, John Jones, is suing SmithFilms for breach of con-
tract.  Jones was hired by SmithFilms as an independent contractor to 
assist SmithFilms in making a movie.  The contract between the par-
ties consists of a one-page letter signed by Jones and Stan Smith, the 
president of SmithFilms.  The letter simply recites that Jones will pro-
vide various services to SmithFilms, that Jones will continue to be paid 
a monthly salary as an independent contractor until the film is re-
leased, and that Jones will receive such other consideration as was 
agreed upon by the parties during the pre-signing breakfast. 
SmithFilms and Jones agree on everything that was discussed at 
the breakfast except whether SmithFilms would give plaintiff producer 
credit.  Jones contends that Smith promised him producer credit and 
SmithFilms denies this.  Both agree that Jones’ efforts turned out to be 
an invaluable part of the film’s production and were in no small 
measure responsible for the film’s ultimate commercial success.  Jones 
is seeking damages arising from SmithFilm’s refusal to give him pro-
ducer credit. 
* * * 
[Suppression Materials:  Prior to trial, the parties became embroiled 
in a discovery dispute.  The dispute concerned a request by Smith-
Films that Jones produce an audiotape which Jones made of a confi-
dential telephone conversation with Greg Gonzalez, an attorney, 
shortly after the contract was signed.  (Gonzales is not representing 
Jones in this lawsuit.)  SmithFilms argued that Gonzalez may have 
been giving Jones business rather than legal advice.  To resolve the 
dispute, the parties requested that you listen to the audiotape in cam-
era.  You do so.  At one point in the tape recorded conversation, the 
following statements were made: 
Jones:  I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for producer 
credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it.  But I 
meant to.  I need your legal opinion, Greg.  Suppose that I send Smith a 
letter now saying that I meant for producer credit to be part of the deal.  
Would that be legally binding? 
Gonzalez:  No.  If you and Smith did not agree on producer credit dur-
ing breakfast, you don’t have a leg to stand on.  A letter now won’t help. 
Jones:  Darn.  That’s a shame. 
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The rest of the audiotape confirms that Gonzalez was functioning 
solely in a legal capacity. 
How would you rule on a motion to compel production of the au-
diotape? (check one) 
___  I would grant the motion. 
___  I would deny the motion.] 
* * * 
At trial, Jones testified that during their breakfast meeting, Smith 
agreed that SmithFilms would give Jones producer credit.  He also 
called as a witness the woman who was their waitress during the break-
fast meeting.  She testified that she thought that she heard one of the 
parties say the words, “you can have producer credit.”  On cross ex-
amination, she admitted that she had trouble remembering the break-
fast and was not 100% certain of this.  Smith had suffered a severe 
stroke just before his deposition was taken and he has been unavail-
able to testify ever since.  SmithFilms offered evidence that SmithFilms 
usually did not give producer credit to independent contractors. 
How would you decide this case (check one): 
____  For Jones, because Smith agreed to give Jones producer 
credit during their meeting. 
____  For SmithFilms, because Smith did not agree to give Jones 
producer credit during their meeting. 
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Evaluation of a Criminal Case 
Imagine that you are presiding over a bench trial in which Mr. 
Geiger has been charged with sexual assault.  The evidence presented 
at trial is summarized below: 
Mr. Geiger is a senior at a local university, as is the complainant, 
Ms. Smith.  Several months ago, Ms. Smith and her new fiancé at-
tended a party hosted by Mr. Geiger’s fraternity.  Several witnesses re-
ported that they saw Ms. Smith drinking heavily at the party.  Wit-
nesses also reported seeing Mr. Geiger and Ms. Smith talking and 
drinking together and that at one point, Mr. Geiger seemed to help 
Ms. Smith “walk” or “stagger” into Mr. Geiger’s room.  The two had 
never met before.  Apparently, Ms. Smith’s fiancé began looking for 
her and was told that she was in Mr. Geiger’s room.  He entered Mr. 
Geiger’s room where he discovered Mr. Geiger on top of Ms. Smith; 
her skirt was pulled up over her waist.  He pulled Mr. Geiger off of Ms. 
Smith, threw him onto the floor, and then stormed off.  Ms. Smith got 
up and ran after him. 
A campus police officer testified that two hours after these events, 
Ms. Smith appeared at the campus police station and charged that she 
had been raped by Mr. Geiger in his room.  She reported to the police 
that she had been drinking heavily and that Mr. Geiger agreed to help 
her into his room because she had become dizzy and needed to lie 
down.  Then, she claimed, he forced himself on her.  She told police 
that she clearly refused to consent to sexual intercourse and shouted 
“no” a couple of times, but Mr. Geiger held her down and continued.  
According to the police officer, Smith became visibly upset while re-
counting her story.  A physical examination revealed bruises on her 
upper thighs. 
Ms. Smith’s fiancé testified that he had initially thought that Ms. 
Smith’s encounter with Mr. Geiger may have been consensual, but 
that several days later, Ms. Smith convinced him that it was not.  They 
had just gotten engaged a few days before the party and still plan to 
get married after college.  He claims that before the incident, Ms. 
Smith was cheerful and extroverted, while now Ms. Smith seems 
moody and depressed.  He asserted that she often bursts into tears for 
no reason and is afraid to attend social gatherings. 
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* * * 
[Suppression Materials:  In his defense, Mr. Geiger is trying to intro-
duce testimony from five other students, 3 male and 2 female, that Ms. 
Smith had a well-deserved reputation for being sexually promiscuous.  
This includes one of Ms. Smith’s best friends who will testify that be-
fore Ms. Smith met her fiancé, she “had trouble remembering what 
fraternity house she woke up in each Sunday morning.”  Another wit-
ness, a former roommate of Ms. Smith, will assert that Ms. Smith 
“liked to loosen her inhibitions with a few beers too many and then 
have rough sex with the first guy she saw.”  The prosecution has 
moved to exclude such evidence on the ground that it violates Ari-
zona’s “Rape Shield” statute (section 13-1421 of the Arizona Criminal 
Code) which forbids the introduction of evidence concerning a vic-
tim’s “chastity” or “reputation for chastity” in cases involving sexual as-
sault. 
How would you rule? 
____ This testimony is admissible. 
____ This testimony is not admissible.] 
* * * 
Mr. Geiger testified in his own defense.  He admitted having in-
tercourse with Ms. Smith, but he contends that she consented to the 
encounter.  He admitted to having intercourse with seven different 
women during his time at college, most of which were one-time en-
counters at parties.  He denied that he has ever had sex without a 
woman’s consent. 
Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you find Mr. 
Geiger guilty of sexual assault? 
Yes              No 
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Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages 
You are presiding over a bench trial in a civil case.  The facts are as 
follows: 
The plaintiff is Bill Post, a single, 35-year-old automobile mechanic.  
On February 20, 2001, Mr. Post slipped while operating a riding [lawn-
mower/snowblower] on a steep driveway.  The [mower/blower] tipped 
onto him, severely damaging his left arm.  (Mr. Post is right handed.)  
Although the [mower/blower] was equipped with a kill-switch that 
should have turned the [mower/blower] off when it tipped, the switch 
malfunctioned. 
The manufacturer, [Lawn/Snow] King, Inc., admitted that the 
kill-switch contained a manufacturing defect and admitted that it was 
liable to Mr. Post.  The parties settled on amounts for medical ex-
penses and lost wages, but could not agree on compensatory damages 
for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.  This amount is the 
only issue to be resolved at trial. 
During the trial, Mr. Post presented testimony from a surgeon 
about the three lengthy operations that were required to repair the 
damage to Post’s shoulder and arm, and from a rehabilitation special-
ist about Post’s bi-weekly physical therapy sessions.  Both agreed that 
Mr. Post’s condition is unlikely to improve.  Although his left arm did 
not have to be amputated, the nerves and muscles were so badly dam-
aged that it is essentially useless. 
Mr. Post testified about the incident, as well as about the continu-
ing pain in his arm, the loss of his job, the frustration of adapting to 
life with just one usable arm, and the nature and extent of his pain 
and resulting total disability.  Among other things, Mr. Post testified 
that he had to take prescription narcotic pain medication continu-
ously. 
* * * 
[Suppression Materials:  During its brief cross-examination of Mr. 
Post, [Lawn/Snow] King sought to introduce evidence of Post’s four 
prior felony convictions.  Specifically, Mr. Post had been convicted of 
swindling schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly re-
tirees by falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then 
using their money to pay his living expenses.  His most recent convic-
tion was fourteen years ago, and he had spent two years in prison for 
this conviction.  [Lawn/Snow] King concedes that pursuant to Rule 
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609 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, the evidence of Post’s prior 
convictions is admissible only to impeach his credibility.  Mr. Post ob-
jected to admitting this evidence, even with a limiting instruction.  He 
contended that “the probative value of the conviction” does not “sub-
stantially outweigh its prejudicial effect” as required by Rule 609(b) of 
the Arizona Rules of Evidence (which governs the admission of crimi-
nal convictions more than 10 years old). 
How would you rule on the plaintiff’s objection? 
_____  Overrule the objection and allow the plaintiff to be im-
peached with his prior convictions. 
_____  Sustain the objection and exclude the evidence of the 
plaintiff’s prior convictions.] 
* * * 
[Lawn/Snow] King argued that the plaintiff was exaggerating his 
injury.  The company presented testimony from a physical and occu-
pational therapist who had treated many people with injuries similar 
to those suffered by Mr. Post.  This expert testified that such people 
usually can control their pain and lead relatively normal lives. 
Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, how much would 
you award the plaintiff in compensatory damages? 
$____________________ 
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Sentencing 
Before you for sentencing is Sam Kaiser, who was found guilty of 
possession of 150 grams of methamphetamine.  The methamphetamine 
was found in a jacket pocket after a legal search.  At trial, Kaiser ar-
gued, unsuccessfully, that the jacket was not his. 
According to the federal sentencing guidelines, possession of 150 
grams of methamphetamine has a base offense level of 26. 
Kaiser’s criminal history includes several convictions for larceny 
and a minor drug possession.  His total “criminal history points” sum 
to 4, which puts him in category III for sentencing.  Kaiser is 27 years 
old, dropped out of high school when he was 17, has never held em-
ployment for very long, is not married, and has no children.  He was 
raised in poverty by a single mother, who did not appear on his behalf. 
At offense level 26 and criminal history category III, the sentenc-
ing guidelines provide for a sentence of between 78 and 97 months. 
After Kaiser’s conviction, he cooperated with the prosecution in 
exchange for a recommendation that he be sent to a particular prison.  
The prosecution agreed that none of the information he provided 
would be used against him as long as he cooperated fully. 
* * * 
[Control:  Kaiser revealed the name of his supplier, but nothing 
else of substance.] 
* * * 
[Suppression:  Kaiser revealed that he had helped his 30-year-old 
cousin produce methamphetamine in a basement laboratory.  Kaiser 
also revealed that his cousin had a 15-year-old girlfriend who fre-
quently “tried out” their batches for them. 
The prosecution asked that you add 6 levels to Kaiser’s offense 
level, pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, because he had been en-
gaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine in a fashion that had 
endangered a minor.  Chapter 2D1.1(b)(4) of the federal sentencing 
guidelines provides that if the offense “created a substantial risk of 
harm to a minor, increase by 6 levels.”  This would raise the sentence 
to level 32.  At offense level 32 and criminal history category III, the 
sentencing guidelines provide for a sentence of between 151 and 188 
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months.  Kaiser’s attorney argued that the prosecution had agreed not 
to use any of the information he provided against him. 
Would you enhance the sentence level by 6 levels, as the prosecu-
tion requests? 
Yes              No] 
* * * 
No other circumstances supporting any additional enhancements, 
departures, or other adjustments are present. 
What should Kaiser’s sentence consist of? 
_____ months. 
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Fourth Amendment Issue (Foresight-Warrant Condition) 
[Foresight:  Imagine that you have been asked to issue a telephonic 
warrant authorizing Officer John Smoot to search the trunk of a 
parked car.  Here are the facts:] 
[Hindsight:  Imagine that you have been asked to rule on a motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the trunk 
of a parked car.  Here are the facts:] 
Officer Smoot was assigned to patrol public parking areas sur-
rounding an arena holding a rock and roll concert.  While cruising 
the area, Officer Smoot noticed a well-dressed man exit a black BMW.  
The man looked around nervously, opened his trunk, and fiddled 
around with something in the trunk for a few seconds.  After closing 
the trunk and locking the car, the BMW driver met an apparent 
friend, bought concert tickets at the ticket window, and entered the 
arena to attend the concert. 
About 30 minutes later, Officer Smoot drove past the BMW again 
and noticed that the driver’s side window was open.  Officer Smoot as-
sumed the driver wouldn’t return to his car until the concert ended in 
two or three hours, but he wasn’t entirely sure of this.  Concerned that 
the car might be easy prey for an enterprising car thief, Officer Smoot 
parked his patrol car, got out, and went over to the BMW to roll up 
the window. 
Upon arriving at the BMW, Officer Smoot smelled something that 
he believed, based on a demonstration at a training session several 
years earlier, to be burnt methamphetamine.  He looked inside the 
car and didn’t see any drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local 
map, and a couple of empty beer cans. 
[Hindsight:  Based on these observations, Officer Smoot believed 
that there was probable cause to search the trunk of the car.  He 
opened the trunk and found 10 pounds of methamphetamine, other 
drug paraphernalia, and a gun that had recently been fired.  Follow-
ing the concert, one of Officer Smoot’s colleagues arrested the BMW 
driver when he returned to his car.] 
[Foresight:  Based on these observations, Officer Smoot believes 
there is probable cause to search the trunk of this car and has asked 
you to issue a telephonic warrant authorizing the  search.  Will you is-
sue the warrant? 
_____  Yes, there is probable cause for the search; I would issue 
the warrant. 
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_____  No, there is not probable cause for the search; I would not 
issue the warrant.] 
[Hindsight:  Subsequent investigative work revealed that the driver’s 
fingerprints were on the gun and that this gun had been used earlier 
in the day to kill a suspected drug dealer living on the other side of 
the city.  The BMW driver is now being prosecuted for murder, unlaw-
ful possession of a firearm, and several drug violations. 
His defense attorney has filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the trunk on the ground that there was no probable 
cause to conduct the search.  Will you allow the evidence to be admit-
ted? 
_____  Yes, there was probable cause for the search; I would admit 
the evidence. 
_____  No, there was not probable cause for the search; I would 
not allow the evidence to be admitted.] 
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Evaluation of a Robbery Trial 
Mr. Jones is on trial for armed robbery.  Concerned that he is a 
member of a small minority in the community and will face an un-
sympathetic jury, Mr. Jones has waived his right to a jury trial.  You are 
thus presiding in a bench trial.  The following summarizes the evi-
dence presented at trial: 
In the late evening, an armed assailant wearing jeans, a white t-
shirt, a ski mask, and black gloves entered a 7-11 and demanded that 
the cashier put money in a plastic shopping bag.  The cashier com-
plied, quickly emptying roughly $200 into the bag.  The cashier was 
the only other person in the store at the time.  The robbery was cap-
tured on a surveillance camera videotape. 
When police arrived, the cashier gave a brief description of the 
suspect.  The cashier reported that once outside the store, the perpe-
trator pulled off his ski mask, discarding both it and a gun as he 
climbed quickly into a white Ford Taurus and sped off.  The cashier 
stated that he thought that the last two digits of the car’s Arizona li-
cense plate were “GB”.  Police retrieved the gun and mask; neither 
had usable fingerprints.  The gun had been reported stolen several 
years earlier by its original owner, who is now deceased. 
Several police officers then began a search of the neighborhood 
for a white Ford Taurus.  Two hours after the crime, they found one, 
parked 10 blocks from the crime scene.  The last two digits of the li-
cense plate were “C8.”  Department of Motor Vehicle records identi-
fied the owner as the defendant.  The police knocked on the door to 
his apartment.  The defendant matched the height, weight and race of 
the perpetrator in the surveillance videotape, and was wearing jeans 
and a white t-shirt.  The police then insisted that the defendant ac-
company them to the station-house to answer questions, which he did. 
Upon arrival, the police led him to a room, locked the door, read 
him his Miranda rights, and began interrogating him.  The defendant 
reported that he had been home alone all evening.  The police al-
lowed the cashier to listen in from the next room.  The cashier re-
portedly said “that sounds like the guy.”  The police then placed the 
defendant under arrest.  They obtained a search warrant and searched 
his apartment.  They found shopping bags similar to the one used by 
the perpetrator of the crime and a pair of black gloves.  The defen-
dant also had several hundred dollars in cash in his wallet.  The police 
did not find firearms or ammunition of any kind. 
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[Control condition:  The police continued questioning the defen-
dant, but he requested a lawyer and the interrogation ended.] 
[Suppression condition:  The police continued questioning the de-
fendant.  Even though the defendant clearly requested a lawyer, twice, 
the police refused to call one and continued the interrogation.  Two 
hours later, the defendant confessed, and agreed to write out a de-
scription of the crime.  His written description matched the events  
perfectly, including the fact that he discarded the ski mask and gun 
outside the store (which the police had not told him). 
The defendant’s attorney has moved to suppress the confession, 
arguing that the interrogation violated the defendant’s rights under 
Miranda by continuing after the defendant had requested an attorney.  
Would you grant the motion and suppress the evidence? 
Yes              No] 
Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you convict 
the defendant? 
Yes              No 
 
